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INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed a virtual explosion in the legal
and economic literature dealing with predatory pricing. Equally
dramatic has been the swift adoption by several courts of policy
conclusions derived from this literature-a development that is
startling, given the complexity and volume of the literature and
the lack of consensus among legal and economic scholars. The
result has been to raise an acute problem for lawyers and judges
who must assess the validity and applicability of competing eco-
nomic models, mold stubborn and unruly facts to fit abstract eco-
nomic theories, translate economic theories into legal doctrines,
and resolve puzzling cost accounting issues. The predatory pricing
development also raises more fundamental questions. An emerg-
ing but unsettled economic theory has rapidly and pervasively
transformed an entire body of law, and within the briefest period
of time. The predatory pricing experience contains important les-
sons for the careful observer on the uses of economic theory in
the formation of legal policy.
This Article attempts to cut a path through the maze of liter-
ature and theories concerning predatory pricing. Both practical
and theoretical considerations animate this study. On the practical
level, the Article examines the application of the differing econo-
mic theories of predatory pricing, enabling the reader to utilize
them in legal analysis and argumentation and to critically assess
future developments. On the more theoretical level, the discussion
of the predatory pricing development provides a vivid case study
of the issues that confront courts when they attempt to base legal
policy on unsettled economic theory. Part I examines the preda-
tory pricing development in terms of economic theory, viewing
that theory as objectively as possible. Part II explores the meaning
of the differing theories of predation in pragmatic application to
specific facts in judicial proceedings, followed by a more general
discussion in Part III of the issues that confront courts when they
use emerging economic theories as the foundation for legal pol-
icy.
[Vol. 66:738740
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I
ECONOMIC THEORIES OF PREDATORY PRICING
A. The Logic of Predation
1. Classical Predation
Although it is not explicitly defined in the antitrust laws, pre-
dation is generally associated with business practices that would
not otherwise enhance profits but which are utilized to enlarge
the predator's market share with the expectation that this will lead to
a long run gain in profits.' Perhaps the most common example of
predation, at least as measured by the frequency of judicial con-
sideration, involves predatory pricing practices.2 The classical
view of predatory pricing behavior is relatively simple: a domi-
nant firm sells below cost to eliminate rivals and subsequently
earns a monopoly profit. The paradigm example involved the
Standard Oil Trust, which allegedly cut prices in selected markets
to eliminate its small competitors.'
Economists no longer accept the simple classical theory because
of fundamental flaws in its logic. They point out that preda-
tion is more costly to the dominant firm, with its higher volume
of sales, than it is to a smaller rival because the cost of predation
equals the loss per sale multiplied by the number of units sold. In
addition, even if a dominant firm with greater resources were to
succeed in eliminating a smaller rival, predation would not pro-
duce a monopoly profit unless new entry into the industry could
be barred. The previous market entry of the excluded rival sug-
gests, however, that barriers are not insurmountable.4
Empirical evidence, originating with a study of the trial rec-
ord from the 1911 Standard Oil case,5 also suggested that preda-
See F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 335-
36 (2d ed. 1980). Predation may violate several distinct antitrust statutes. See notes 34-35
and accompanying text infra.
2 Predation may also arise when a dominant firm alters the design of its product in an
effort to provide a competitive edge in other markets for accessory goods, or when a
dominant firm utilizes predatory promotional activities to expand its market share by elimi-
nating or discouraging competitors. See, e.g., Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,
603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980).
3 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I (1911); note 6 and accompanying
text infra.
I Indeed, the excluded firm's assets are presumably available either for the dominant
firm or its successor to resume production.
' Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
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tion was rare.6 Although the accuracy of conclusions gleaned
from a data base limited to the trial records and reported deci-
sions in a small number of cases remains open to question, 7 econ-
omists nevertheless agree that the classical view of predatory pric-
ing, in its general form, is, at the very least, incomplete.
2. Amendments to the Classical View
Predatory pricing becomes plausible economic behavior only
when one or more special assumptions are added to the simple
view of classical predation. Because these assumptions underlie
several of the formal models !presented below and are recurring
general themes in predatory pricing discussions, they are intro-
duced at this point with minimum comment.
First, predatory pricing may be a profitable long run strategy
if entry barriers prohibit new firms from entering the industry
and the productive assets of existing firms are highly specialized.
Thus, if a dominant firm holds a significant cost advantage over
potential new rivals, and if the assets of existing rival firms, once
retired, cannot be recommitted to the same market, the dominant
firm has an incentive to engage in predatory pricing even though
it will sustain greater short term losses.8 Under these conditions,
predatory pricing theoretically could lead to long run profit
maximization.9
Second, the logic of predation is strengthened by incorporat-
ing strategic considerations. A dominant firm might profit by elim-
inating one relatively small firm from a market or product line
if that harsh example teaches its other competitors a lesson. In
strategic terms, the dominant firm will seek to establish a credible
threat to pursue the same policy either within this market or in
other markets when entry or other undesired behavior occurs.
The primary prerequisite f6r the success of such strategic interac-
See McGee, Predatory Price Cutting: The Standard Oil (N.J.) Case, 1 J.L. & ECON. 137,
168 (1958). See also Elzinga, Predatory Pricing: The Case of the Gunpowder Trust, 13 J.L. &
ECON. 223 (1970). The classical view of predation is summarized and critiqued in R. BORK,
THE ANrITRUST PARADOX 144-48 (1978), and McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J.L. &
ECON. 289 (1980).
See F. SCHERER, supra note 1, at 336-37. See generally Yamey, Predatory Price Cutting:
Notes and Comments, 15 J.L. & ECON. 129 I(1972).
8 F. SCHERER, supra note 1, at 338.
9 Predation is also a more plausible business strategy when the dominant firm posses-
ses a cost advantage over its existing rivals. The dominant firm can more palatably sustain
predatory pricing when it is capable of eliminating rivals without incurring out-of-pocket
losses, although the effective cost is unchanged in that a firm with cost advantages forgoes
the opportunity for greater short run profits when it engages in predatory price cutting.
[Vol. 66:738
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don is good information, i.e., communicating the unfortunate fate
of one unsuccessful entrant to other possible entrants.'" If other
entrants are aware of this threat, the return from predation,
spread across many markets and extended over time, could amply
exceed the losses sustained in the demonstration effect market."
B. Economic Models Basic to Predatory Pricing Analysis
Post-1975 predatory pricing literature, departing from ear-
lier writing on the subject, explicitly utilizes economic models and
diagrams. The advantage of this presentation method is that it
makes assumptions explicit and forces a rigor of analysis that
words alone rarely achieve. On the other hand, it can create for-
midable barriers for the reader not versed in the language of di-
agrammatic analysis. The following prologue is designed to assist
the reader in mastering this new approach. This subsection ana-
lyzes the two basic diagrammatic models-linear and non-lin-
ear. These models, along with several more complex models
discussed in the Appendices, are used throughout the Article to
explain current theories of predatory pricing and the proposed
rules for judicial decisionmaking.
1. The Linear Cost Model
Because the linear cost model is the simplest, it is, whenever
adequate, the preferable model for the analysis of cost-based legal
rules. The model assumes constant marginal costs, no fixed costs,
and, therefore, that marginal costs equal average costs. 2 Thus, it
is easy to determine whether a price is above or below cost. Figure
1 illustrates a model based upon these assumptions relevant to an
,o It is assumed that good information, but not necessarily perfect information, is avail-
able. If perfect information were available, the strategy would fail because possible entrants
would recognize the bluff. See McGee, 23 J.L. & ECON., supra note 6, at 299-300.
" See R. POSNER, AwTrTRus-r LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 186 (1976); F. SCHERER,
supra note 1, at 338-49. See generally 2 A. NEvINS, STUDY IN POWER: JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER
61-69 (1953) (price-cutting used by Standard Oil Trust primarily to inhibit competiiors
rather than force them out of business).
'2 Marginal costs are the additional costs incurred to produce one more unit of output.
Constant marginal cost exists when total cost changes by a constant amount for each unit
that output is increased or decreased. Fixed costs (e.g., overhead) are costs incurred in each
time period independent of the rate of production. The model assumes no recurring fixed
costs and thus, when marginal cost is constant, average cost (the sum of fixed and variable
costs divided by the quantity of output) is equivalent to marginal cost.
It may be necessary to assume small but nontrivial one time start-up costs so that
unsuccessful entry efforts are not completely costless. These start-up costs, however, need
not create any significant scale economies.
1981] 743
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FIGURE 1
Linear Cost Model
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example of predatory pricing. The entrant's costs (both marginal
and average) '" are depicted .by the line MCe and the dominant
firm's costs by the line MCm. Pm is the monopoly price and Pc is
the price at which the entrant breaks even (i.e., the entrant's com-
petitive price).
If it is assumed, contrary to Figure 1, that the entrant's costs
equalled the dominant firm's cost (Me = MCm), then the entrant
could easily enter the market and the dominant firm could elim-
inate the entrant only by selling below its own costs (MCm). Figure
1, however, presents the more interesting case. The entrant's costs
exceed the dominant firm's costs (MCe exceeds MCm), but the en-
trant's costs are nevertheless below the dominant firm's monopoly
price (MCe is less than Pm). Because of its lower costs, the domi-
nant firm may be able to eliminate the entrant if it is permitted to
reduce its price (Pm) to a level below the entrant's costs but above
its own costs. But suppose that after the entrant is eliminated the
dominant firm then reinstitutes the monopoly price.
Is Note that in this model, average costs equal marginal costs. See note 12 supra. The
same applies to the dominant firm's costs.
744 [Vol. 66:738
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As the amended classical theory suggests, the restored
monopoly price will be short-lived in the absence of high entry
barriers because new firms, attracted by the monopoly price, will
enter the market and force the price back to competitive levels.
Assume, however, that entry barriers are high " or that the elim-
ination of a single entrant will deter others. With its lower costs,
the monopolist can reduce its price without incurring losses. The
higher-cost entrant, foreseeing the prospect of indefinite losses, with-
draws, permitting the monopolist to raise its price back to Pm
and hold it there indefinitely because other firms are unable to
surmount the high entry barriers. The behavior of the monopolist
in this case may be socially undesirable even though it does not
eliminate a more efficient-or even an equally efficient-
competitor because monopoly conditions have been restored.
Although the monopolist produces at lower cost than the entrant,
the monopolist's subsequent output restriction produces a loss in
economic welfare that may outweigh the saving from the monop-
olist's lower cost of production. The reason for this is that the
monopolist previously supplied part of the market at lower cost
before it obtained the monopoly position. The monopolist now
serves the entire market, but the cost savings produced by its
greater productive efficiency affects only the portion of the mar-
ket previously supplied by the entrant, which is then measured
against the welfare impact of the price increase levied on the en-
tire market.'5
14 This particular entrant might have possessed special technological knowledge or cus-
tomer connections that are unavailable to other would-be entrants.
15 Figure 1 readily illustrates these social welfare implications. The social (or "dead-
weight") loss from monopoly is the loss of consumer benefit from the diminished output
(illustrated by the triangle ABC). Although this is offset by the monopolist's greater effi-
ciency, the efficiency gain is realized only over the smaller part of the productive output supplied by
the entrant that is now supplied by the monopolist. Under the plausible assumption that the
entrant supplies only a relatively minor share of the market, a net social loss remains. Cf.
Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 699, 709 (1977)
(monopoly created by merger produces net allocative efficiency loss if cost saving from
merger is less than net price increase). The transfer of revenue to the monopolist in the
amount of rectangle ABDE is also counted as a social loss by some economists, thus in-
creasing the total social loss. For an argument that the efficiency gain will seldom offset the
welfare loss from monopoly pricing (assuming that after predation, the monopolist would
charge the pure monopoly price), see R. POSNER & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST: CASES,
ECONOMIc NOTES AND OTHER MATERIALS 920-21 & n.* (2d ed 1981).
This dilemma becomes more acute when the concept of learning-by-doing is intro-
duced. This concept implies that a new entrant is inevitably less efficient in its early de-
velopment stages. As the entrant accumulates more experience, however, its costs may
decrease until at some point it becomes equally efficient (or even more efficient) than the
monopolist. On the other hand, the entrant's financial support may diminish if the domi-
nant firm can create sufficient short run losses before the entrant accumulates the experi-
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
The simple linear cost model thus illustrates the basic logic of
cost-based rules. The model also demonstrates, however, that
even an inefficient entrant promotes competition when the
alternative is a single firm monopoly with blockaded entry. Sev-
eral courts have acted as if they understood this insight from the
linear model, stating in dicta that price reductions below the short
run monopoly price are unlawful when entry barriers are ex-
tremely high. 6 Despite the unrealism of its cost assumptions, the
linear cost model is adequate for legal analysis whenever price is
below (or above) all relevant costs, marginal or average. The mod-
el's failure to distinguish between the various types of cost is un-
important; indeed, this omission is desirable because it simplifies
the analysis. 7
2. Non-Linear Cost Models
The simplicity of the linear cost model is inappropriate
under recent theories of predatory pricing-most particularly the
Areeda and Turner analysis' '-which use cost functions differing
from those of the linear cost model. Indeed, it is not possible to
understand either the economics or the legal application of these
more complex theories without recourse to the non-linear model.
The non-linear cost model introduces two assumptions not
present in the linear model: the existence of fixed costs, and of
nonconstant marginal costs. Figure 2, which represents the cost
function of the monopolist, is the key diagram used in the
Areeda-Turner model.'9 The cost relationship illustrated by Fig-
ure 2 is the basic textbook diagram of short run production costs
of the firm viewed statically- i.e., at a single moment in time.
ence it needs to reduce its costs. Financers do not know with certainty if the new entrant
will progress down the textbook curve that illustrates declining costs as cumulative output
increases. Thus, they may balk at underwriting large short run losses. See F. SCHERER, supra
note 1, at 250-52.
16 See Pierce Packing Co. v. John Morrell & Co., 633 F.2d 1362, 1366-67 (9th Cir.
1980); Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 856 (9th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978); International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517
F.2d 714, 724-25 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976); ILC Peripherals Leasing
Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 433-34 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
17 All economic (and other scientific) models are simplifications of reality and hence
unrealistic. The utility of a model, however, depends upon whether the model omits some-
thing essential to the purpose for which it is used.
IS See 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw 712 (1978); Areeda & Turner,
Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV.
697, 700-01 (1975).
" See note 18 supra.
[Vol. 66:738
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Figure 2 clearly demonstrates that marginal costs (MC), average
variable costs (AVO), and average total costs (ATC) are not identical
in a non-linear cost function. 21 In contrast to the simple linear
model of Figure 1, Figure 2 assumes that significant fixed costs
are present and marginal or incremental costs rise as output in-
creases. This explains why the average variable cost function and
average total cost function decline at first, but eventually rise as
output is increased, giving them their familar U-shaped
pattern.2 ' The underlying arithmetic dictates that the marginal
cost curve must pass through the lowest points on both the aver-
age variable cost curve and the average total cost curve.
3. The Areeda and Turner Analysis of the Non-linear Cost Model
The Areeda and Turner analysis of price-cost relationships,22
which is discussed in the next several paragraphs in conjunction
20 Average total cost, usually expressed simply as average cost, equals the sum of aver-
age variable costs and average fixed costs.
21 Declining average fixed costs (achieved by spreading constant fixed costs over a
larger volume) and low marginal costs pull the average cost curves down as output is
gradually increased from zero. Continuously increasing marginal costs (produced when
output begins to strain plant capacity) eventually overcome the effect of the declining aver-
age fixed costs and force average total costs to rise as output reaches higher levels.
I See note 18 supra.
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with Figure 3, simply follows the basic textbook analysis of the
short run model of the firm. Their analysis will facilitate an
understanding of the non-linear model and lay the foundation for
a more detailed discussion of the Areeda-Turner rule as well as
alternative rules for predatory pricing.
Figure 3 replicates the cost curves in Figure 2 with two dif-
ferences. First, the average variable cost curve is omitted for clar-
ity of exposition. In their theoretical development, Areeda and
Turner employ only marginal costs and average total costs. (Aver-
age variable costs enter their analysis later as a legal proxy for
marginal costs.) Second, two alternative demand curves are im-
posed on the diagram. DID, represents a relatively strong de-
mand and D2D2 represents a weak demand. An understanding of
price-cost relationships generally, and the Areeda-Turner com-
binations in particular, is facilitated by the recognition that a
price-quantity choice for the monopolist must be on the demand
FIGURE 3
Demand Functions Added to Non-linear Cost Model
I \ D1
0 1 I 1 10Qd Q QeQb O
OUTPUT
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curve.2  Within this framework, it is now possible to consider the
monopolist's potential responses to a new entrant in either of
these two possible states of demand.24
a. Strong Demand. The demand curve labeled D1D1 illus-
trates a market demand sufficient to permit productive output
beyond the point of lowest per unit cost. Assuming these demand
conditions, a monopolist might choose three possible prices. Price
Pa is clearly above both the monopolist's average cost and mar-
ginal cost for output Q,. This situation is identical to that illustrated
in the simple linear diagram (Figure 1). Price Pa excludes an en-
trant who cannot produce at an output level that yields average
costs as low as Pa and hence, will eliminate only a less efficient
rival. In light of the earlier discussion regarding the negative so-
cial welfare consequences of monopoly,- the reader should
understand that over the long run, competition is not necessarily
improved by permitting a price cut to Pa notwithstanding that a
less efficient firm is eliminated. Areeda and Turner, however,
label a price cut to this level "competition on the merits" that
should be lawful.26 As demonstrated in the preceding discussion
regarding the social welfare costs of monopoly, 27 the efficiency
issues generated by predatory pricing are often complex even in
the seemingly simple' cases.
If Pa is not low enough to eliminate the entrant under the
demand conditions of DID,, the monopolist that wishes to elim-
inate its rival may need to drop its price to Pb and expand out-
put to Qb. As illustrated by Figure 3, price Pb covers average cost
but is below marginal cost. Such a price is inefficient because it
does not reflect the full incremental costs of production. 8
Although they have equivocated in their analysis of Price Pb,
Areeda and Turner now agree that this price is below the level of
efficient pricing and hence is predatory when it falls substantially
below marginal cost.29
2 Any price-quantity choice must be on the demand curve simply because the demand
curve defines the price at which any quantity can be sold. It is also implied in this illustra-
tion that the entrant is relatively small, an assumption that for present purposes is not
critical for the results of the model.
2'4 The monopolist's original price is not indicated in Figure 3. The analysis only re-
quires that the price must have been high enough to attract new entrants.
2 See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
2 Areeda & Turner, supra note 18, at 706. See generally id. at 704-11.
2 See text accompanying notes 14-15 supra.
2' That is, marginal cost is the additional cost per unit of output. Price Pb is below the
marginal cost curve at output level Qb-
2 At first, Areeda and Turner viewed price Pb as permissible so long as it was above
average total cost. They reasoned that an efficient entrant should be able to find some
7491981]
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If Pb is not low enough to eliminate the entrant, the monop-
olist may find it necessary to lower its price to Pr. At output Q,
associated with P., the price does not cover either the monopolist's
marginal cost or its average total cost. The monopolist not only
directly misallocates resources by producing output for which the
price is less than marginal cost, but also eliminates a more effi-
cient rival that should be preserved. This situation resembles the
below-cost pricing illustrated in the simple linear model and is
clearly anticompetitive. Not surprisingly, Areeda and Turner
agree that such a price is unlawful. 0
b. Weak Demand. Demand curve D2D2 illustrates a condition
of slack demand in which the output level that consumers de-
mand at any profit-yielding price is below the level at which pro-
duction is most efficient. This is normally described as a condition
of excess capacity and it produces yet another variation-the
situation associated with price Pd and output Q. At this price and
output level, price is greater than marginal cost but below average
total cost. Both the entrant and the monopolist would lose money
at this price. If the entrant perceives that the monopolist has a
deep pocket and that the monopolist is determined to fight in-
truders, the entrant will presumably see the folly of remaining in
the market and drop out. Although they note that an equally effi-
cient entrant in long run terms could be eliminated by Pd, Areeda
and Turner would permit such a price, reasoning that this result
occurs only when there is excess capacity. The loss of the entrant's
productive capacity causes no social loss because some existing
excess capacity must be reti ed.5 1
If Pd is not sufficiently low to eliminate entrants, the mo-
nopolist may reduce price to Pe. Price Pe is identical in its impact
to P, and thus, is inefficient even in the short run. Areeda and
Turner as well as other authors consider this price clearly
anticompetitive. s2
output level at which average costs would be less than Pb; thus, only less efficient rivals
would be excluded. See Areeda & Turner, supra note 18, at 712-13. After Williamson pub-
lished his critique, Areeda and Turner retreated from this position to one that allowed the
lower price only if it was not substantially below marginal cost. See 3 P. AREEDlA & D.
TURNER, supra note 18, 715b2.
o See 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 18, 715b.
'1 Id. 714a, n.1, 715a, n.7. Areeda and Turner do not discuss the possibility that a
small but more efficient entrant, as measured by average total costs, will be eliminated by
price Pd. This might occur if the small firm's average cost were below AC at output Qd but
its variable and marginal costs were above Pd- In that event, price Pd would eliminate the
lower-cost producer in terms of total cost, leaving the high cost capacity in place.
-1 Id. 1 715b.
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As demonstrated by the preceding discussion, the non-linear
cost model introduces additional complexities not present in the
linear cost model even though the analysis is confined to the rel-
atively simply textbook diagram of short run costs. The following
section uses the non-linear cost model to examine the specific eco-
nomic theories of predation proposed for legal application.
C. Theories and Proposed Rules for Predatory Pricing: The Short Run
Marginal Cost Approach
Economic and legal commentators do not agree either on the
best analytic approach to predatory pricing or on the appropriate
legal rule. This diversity of analytic viewpoints challenges lawyers
and judges who must resolve pending cases. The subject becomes
more manageable, however, by categorizing the theories and
proposed rules into short run and long run approaches, and by
analyzing them against the background of the basic logic of pred-
atory pricing. Areeda and Turner have developed the principal
short run analysis. Their theory remains the focal point for study
because it initiated the fundamental reexamination of predatory
pricing policy.
1. The Areeda-Turner Rule
Areeda and Turner derive their rule directly from short run
static analysis based on the non-linear cost model. Under this
analysis, marginal cost is the correct standard for efficient pricing.
If the dominant firm's price equals or exceeds marginal cost, it
cannot eliminate a more efficient competitor (except when excess
capacity exists).s Areeda and Turner therefore consider as
nonpredatory any price charged by a dominant firm that at least
equals its short run marginal costs. This simply stated argument
forms the core of the Areeda and Turner analysis. The Areeda-
Turner rule, however, is more complex because marginal cost is
an analytic tool of economic theory, ill suited for courtroom use.
To adjust the short run pricing model for purposes of litigation,
Areeda and Turner substitute average variable cost as a proxy for
marginal cost.
Building on this foundation, Areeda and Turner propose the
following conceptually simple rules, applicable to single firm pred-
" See notes 22-32 and accompanying text supra.
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atory pricing under both the Sherman Act34 and the Robinson-
Patman Act 11:
(A) A price above marginal cost is conclusively presumed
lawful.
(B) A price below marginal cost is conclusively presumed un-
lawful, subject to the limitation that under conditions of
strong demand, price may fall moderately below mar-
ginal cost so long as it remains above average total cost.
(C) Because it is difficult to ascertain marginal cost, average
variable cost may serve as a proxy for marginal cost
yielding these conditions:
(1) A price above "reasonably anticipated" average vari-
able cost is conclusively presumed lawful;
(2) A price below average variable cost is conclusively
presumed unlawful3 6
The simplicity of the Areeda-Turner pricing rules is only su-
perficial. Having compromised the marginal cost principle to the
practical limitations of judicial proof by introducing the proxy of
average variable cost, Areeda and Turner were forced to make
further adjustments. There is no constant relationship between
average variable cost and marginal cost: average variable cost may
be less than, equal to, or greater than marginal cost, depending
upon the level of output., The strain on the Areeda-Turner
theory becomes excessive when marginal cost rises significantly
above average variable cost or (at higher output levels) substan-
tially above average total cost. In these situations, an average vari-
able cost proxy for marginal cost is unacceptable-the legal rule
must embody the more problematic marginal cost standard. The
net result is that the legal rule must account for not only the rela-
tionship between price and cost at the current level of output, but
also for the relationships between the different cost functions.
These relationships are illustrated in Figure 4, which shows the
Areeda-Turner pricing floors with solid lines:
Predatory pricing violates the proscription in § 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2
(1976), against monopolization or the attempt to monopolize. See, e.g., United States v.
Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570 (1966).
The Clayton Act, as amended by ithe Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 13(a), 13a
(1976), prohibits predatory pricing by ai firm serving several markets through its proscrip-
tion against price discrimination. See, e.gj, Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S.
685 (1967).
' See 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 18, 1 711d.
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FIGURE 4
Areeda-Turner Pricing Floors
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It is strikingly apparent that any one of three relevant costs may
become the legal floor at different levels of output. At low output
levels, average variable cost (AVC) is the floor below which price
cannot drop; at moderate levels when short run marginal cost
(SRMC) rises "significantly" above AVC, SRMG becomes the
floor; as output increases over the moderate range, average total
cost (ATC) becomes the pricing floor; finally, as output con-
tinues to increase, SRMC again becomes the pricing floorY
Areeda and Turner consciously developed a permissive pred-
atory pricing rule because they believe that the phenomenon of
predation is rare."' They were also concerned about the det-
rimental effects of a more restrictive rule or policy; they feared
that such a rule would invite frequent litigation attacking pricing
behavior, and thereby deter even socially desirable pricing con-
duct because risk-averse firms would avoid otherwise lawful price
" The Areeda-Turner pricing standards are further complicated by the use of
"reasonably anticipated" costs in place of actual costs. Id. 715d. They reason that
[a] firm may legitimately determine its price and output levels according to
expected future costs rather than historical accounting costs. Of course, histor-
ical costs may be the best approximation of costs for the near future, but a
defendant should be permitted to show why it anticipated lower costs in the
future.
Id. at 174.
'1 Areeda & Turner, supra note 18, at 698-99.
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reductions." Their rule thus places restraints only on dominant
firms. It uses average variable cost as a proxy for marginal cost
when average variable cost! falls below, but not "significantly"
below, marginal cost; the rule departs from the marginal cost princi-
ple again when marginal cost rises moderately, but not exces-
sively, above average total cost.4" On the other hand, Areeda and
Turner have mitigated the inherent underinclusiveness of their
rule by including in their definition of average variable cost com-
ponents not normally defined as variable costs. 4' The legal stan-
dard that emerges from these complex adjustments cannot be
simply characterized, but Areeda and Turner nevertheless suggest
per se application.
2. Economic Critique of the Areeda-Turner Rule
a. Summary. The Areeda-Turner proposal often has been
challenged by economic commentators. The critics, who include
Professors Baumol, Greer, Joskow, Klevorick, Posner, Scherer,
Schmalensee, and Williamson, contend that a short run marginal
cost pricing rule disregards the essence of the predatory pricing
problem-strategic behavior over time. Several critics also doubt,
in light of these strategic considerations, whether the rule will
achieve efficiency even in the short run.
b. A Basic Objection to the Marginal Cost Standard. Even when
they share Areeda and Turner's assumption that the goal of a
predatory pricing policy is confined to short run efficiency, many
critics still fault the marginal cost standard. They argue that the
necessity of using average variable cost as a proxy for marginal
cost will inevitably distort achievement of short run efficiency,
particularly at outputs where average variable cost is less than
marginal cost.42 In addition, application of the marginal cost/
average variable cost test is significantly affected by variances in
the ratio of fixed to variable cost.4" This variance may occur
when the competing firms employ radically different technologies,
produce slightly differing products, or possess differing degrees
of vertical integration. A marginal cost pricing rule could, under
'9 See 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supa note 18, T 71 1c, 714.
o Id. 715b, 715d.
41 For example, they would treat all advertising and promotional expenses as a variable
(short run) cost even though some of these expenses are clearly long run in nature. See id.
715c.
42 See Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 925, 942
(1979).
"' Economists also refer to this ratio as the capital intensity of production.
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such circumstances, generate large differences in pricing discre-
tion among firms with identical total costs."
c. Marginal Cost Rule Frustrated by Short Run Output Expansion.
Because a judicially sanctioned marginal cost rule will become one
of the legal constraints facing each firm, many critics assert that
further adaptive or strategic behavior must be anticipated. Profes-
sor Scherer has produced an elaborate analysis illustrating the
potential effects of a marginal cost rule for predatory pricing.4
Although its fine detail is complex, the fundamentals of his analy-
sis are easily understood.46
Scherer presents a strategy by which a dominant firm might
circumvent a marginal cost pricing rule by taking preemptive ac-
tion prior to entry. A dominant firm utilizing this strategy, which
is effective even against an equally efficient entrant, will set its
pre-entry output at a level so high that the market can accommo-
date the entrant's additional output only at a price below the en-
trant's average cost. (It is assumed that scale economies require
that the entrant be of reasonable size if it is not to suffer signifi-
candy higher costs than the existing dominant firm.) The putative
entrant, foreseeing these repercussions, is deterred from entering
the market even though the pre-entry price is always above the
dominant firm's costs. This tactic, which requires the monopolist
to forgo some of its short run profits in an attempt to preserve its
monopoly position, is termed "limit pricing. 41
d. Marginal Cost Rule Frustrated by Strategic Long Run Capacity
Choices. Because of the method by which the Areeda-Turner rule
provides added flexibility to a dominant firm with excess capacity,
Professor Williamson has argued that the rule encourages a firm
deliberately to choose a plant size that is larger than would be
optimal to produce the short run profit-maximizing output, and
to operate that plant at less than full capacity.48 To the extent
that this occurs, the dominant firm's present or pre-entry output
is less than its most efficient level of output. At this relatively low
output level, illustrated by the "weak demand" case of Figure 3
4 See Williamson, Williamson on Predatory Pricing IT, 88 YALE L.J. 1183, 1188-89 (1979).
41 See Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 HARv. L. REv. 869
(1976). See generally F. SCHERER, supra note 1, at chs. 11 & 12.
46 For a more detailed explanation of Professor Scherer's model, see Appendix A infra.
41 See Appendix A infra. Areeda and Turner have questioned the amount and fre-
quency of predatory pre-entry output expansion. See 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note
18, 718.
48 See Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic and Welfare Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 284,
299-302 (1977). The Williamson model explaining this aspect of strategic behavior is dis-
cussed in detail in Appendix B infra.
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(line D2D2), the dominant firm's marginal cost is far below its
average total cost. Under these conditions, a marginal cost pricing
rule provides the dominant firm with a substantial range over
which it may expand output and reduce price below its own aver-
age cost and thus, below the costs of an equally efficient entrant.
An entrant recognizing this contingency is deterred from entering
the market.
e. The Essence of Predatory Behavior and the General Insufficiency
of Cost-Based Standards. Criticism of the Areeda-Turner rule ex-
tends beyond its marginal cost formulation to the inherent limita-
tions of any cost-based pricing standard. Such mechanical
standards fail to address the Istrategic essence of predation, which
is essentially a form of communication aimed at convincing
prospective entrants that they will not recoup their costs and earn
a positive return. Predation is economically undesirable when it
excludes from the market any firm that would make a positive
contribution to allocative efficiency, measured over the long run.
For this reason, a short run! marginal cost pricing rule may not
effectively bar predatory behavior that reduces economic effiency.
The net result is an underinclusive legal standard. Some critics
have concluded that an effective predatory pricing policy must
take an approach that includes strategic factors and assesses legal
rules in terms of long run welfare effects. 49
Indeed, no single cost standard-not even a full cost
standard-is sufficiently flexible to induce efficient behavior by a
firm operating at varying levels of capacity over the full range of
business and production possibilities. A rule based on a full cost
standard must still account for the possibility that a price below
average total cost may be justified under some conditions, such as
chronic excess capacity or large scale new entry.50 Areeda and
Turner have attempted to address this problem under their mar-
ginal cost rule by employing multiple cost standards that vary with
output level. Multiple cost standards, however, require ascer-
taining the shape and general position of each relevant cost func-
tion, which is a difficult task.,2  Alternative rules propose a single
full cost standard supplemented by additional evidence of market
9 But see McGee, 23 J.L. & ECON. supra note 6, at 307-20 (expressing serious doubts
about the contribution of alternative models proposed by Areeda-Turner critics that are
insufficiently "dynamic").
50 See Joskow & Klevorick, A Framework for Analyzing Predatory Pricing Policy, 89 YALE
L.J. 213, 252-54 (1979).
5 See 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 18, 715a, 715b.
52 See text accompanying note 37 supra.
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condition, intent or both." Other critics would entirely or sub-
stantially abandon cost-based rules in favor of rules resting on
other criteria."
3. Areeda and Turner Rebuttal
Areeda and Turner have responded to their critics, particu-
larly Scherer and Williamson. ns Their rebuttal is briefly summa-
rized as follows: Although it is the summum bonum of a predatory
pricing policy, long run welfare or efficiency cannot be effectively
achieved within the limitations of the legal system. Thus, the mar-
ginal cost rule is preferred not because it is ideal but because it is
the best standard among imperfect alternatives. In particular, the
marginal cost rule is preferable because it is unlikely to misclassify
as predatory, behavior that is nonpredatory. This is a decisive fac-
tor because predatory behavior, in their view, is rare.
D. Alternative Long Run Pricing Rules
Each of Areeda and Turner's principal critics proposes
alternative rules, based on long run economic goals. This array of
alternatives to the marginal cost rule, briefly outlined in the pre-
ceding section, provides the necessary background for framing
the economic issues in predatory pricing cases. The essentials of
long run cost analysis are discussed first, followed by a discussion
of the proposed long run pricing rules.
1. Essentials of Long Run Cost Analysis
Analyzing the long run behavior of the firm involves addi-
tional cost functions, the most important of which is long run
average cost. The Williamson model conveniently illustrates the
application of long run cost theory to predatory pricing.55
Although the courts have not employed them in a rigorous or
diagrammatical form, long run models have indirectly affected
judicial decisions because of the influence exercised by predatory
pricing commentators.
For economists, the long run is that period in which produc-
tive capacity is subject to change. Williamson directly utilizes long
s See text accompanying notes 64-66 infra.
See text accompanying notes 67-79 infra.
" The details of the various rebuttals and surrebuttals, which have not changed the
views of the participants, are quite technical and thus, are not fully explicated in this Arti-
cle.
See Appendix B infra.
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run analysis to support his thesis that a marginal cost rule creates
an incentive for a dominant firm to build excess capacity in order
to deter entry. A basic knowledge of Williamson's diagrammatic
model facilitates understanding of the fundamentals of long run
cost analysis.
Figure 5, which depicts the industry demand curve, marginal
revenue curve, and the dominant firm's long run average cost
curve, illustrates the key relationships in Williamson's long run
model. The diagram thus contains two concepts- marginal
revenue and long run average costs-not used in the models pre-
viously discussed. Marginal revenue (MR) is the additional rev-
enue procured from the sale of another unit of output. 7 Long
run average total cost (often termed long run average cost or
LRAC) is an extension of the concept of short run average total
cost. Short run average cost illustrates how average total cost
changes at different output levels for a particular size plant. On the
other hand, long run average cost illustrates how average total
cost changes over the full range of possible plant sizes. It is essential
to remember that the long run average cost curve is derived from
a series of short run average cost curves. Every point on the long
run curve thus represents in theory a particular size plant chosen
to minimize the costs of producing that level of output."
As indicated by Figure 5, i long run average cost declines over
low output levels but eventually becomes constant at Qmi.; thus,
there are no further economies of scale beyond that output level.
Q* is the profit maximizing output and P* is the profit maximiz-
ing price, provided that the dominant firm is not concerned with
entry by other firms. 9
Williamson uses this long run cost analysis to demonstrate
that the limited constraints of the Areeda-Turner marginal cost
rule allows a dominant firm strategically to select a plant size that
will preclude entry by an equally efficient firm. As illustrated in
Figure 5, a pure monopolist would maximize profits at plant size
Q*. If the dominant firm built a size Q* plant, however, another
firm could enter the market with an equally efficient plant of size
7 Recall that marginal cost is the additional cost incurred by producing another unit of
output. Marginal revenue is used to identify the short run profit maximizing output for a
monopoly.
m For a diagrammatic representation of the relationship between the long run function
and the short run curves at one output level, see note 61 infra (Figure 6).
" The profit maximizing output Q* denotes where MR = LRAC (which also equals
long run marginal cost at output levels beyond Q..); the profit maximizing price P* corre-
sponds with demand at output Q*.
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Qmi without expanding total output so greatly as to force price
below LRAC.6 °
A dominant firm could strategically attempt to deter entry by
constructing a larger than optimal plant. The larger plant oper-
ates most efficiently (at lowest cost) not at production level Q*,
but at the substantially higher production level of Qm. Q m is so
much greater than Q* that if the monopolist actually produced
output Qm insufficient demand would prevent the entrant from
fully utilizing an efficient plant size. Thus, if the entrant builds a
large and efficient plant, the additional output produced will
drive the market price below the entrant's own costs. Moreover,
unlike the situation in the Scherer model, the dominant firm can-
not be impugned for strategically setting output because it
would be operating at an efficient level of output for the chosen
plant size.'
'0 The dominant firm could, of course, increase short run output above Q*. Its plant,
which was selected from all possible plant sizes that constitute the LRAC schedule, is de-
signed to operate most efficiently at output Q*; therefore, such an expansion would push
its production costs above the entrant's.
61 To understand why the Areeda-Turner rule is not violated, it is necessary to explain
the relationship between short and long run costs. When the dominant firm constructed a
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On the other hand, if the entrant chooses a smaller and less
efficient plant, it will start from a position of high average costs
and, given the proper choice of Qm, the dominant firm can ex-
pand output slightly beyond Qm to force the price below the en-
trant's costs without violating the Areeda-Turner rule because the
price will still be equal to or greater than its marginal cost. Thus,
there is no profitable output at which entrant can operate, and it
will decline to enter. The dominant firm, on the other hand, con-
tinues to operate its plant at the short run profit maximizing
level.
Williamson concludes from this analysis that the Areeda-
Turner rule will not prevent significant predatory behavior. He
proposes an alternative, output-based rule that would prohibit a
dominant firm from increasing post-entry output beyond its pre-
entry output level.6'
plant that would reach maximum efficiency (lowest cost) at output level Qm, the minimum
point on the firm's short run average total cost curve also became Qm Figure 6 depicts this
relationship by superimposing the short run cost curves at output Qm on the long run
average cost curve from Figure 5.
i .t t 6
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Pre-entry output (Q*), however, is below Qm and price (P*) is above LRAC. If the domi-
nant firm responds to entry by increasing output to Qm and reducing price to LRAC, the
Areeda-Turner rule is still not violated because price has not fallen below short run mar-
ginal cost (SRMC = LRAC at Qm).
62 See text accompanying notes 67-69 infra; Appendix B infra.
Williamson's proposal provoked an extensive debate with Areeda and Turner focusing
on the efficacy of their alternative proposals. See Williamson, supra note 48; Areeda &
Turner, Williamson on Predatory Pricing, 87 YALE L.J. 1337 (1978); Williamson, supra note
44. Although conducted entirely at a theoretical level, the exchange between these scholars
did clarify several issues. First, predatory pricing rules promote multiple goals, and no rule
optimally serves all relevant goals. A cost-based rule, for example, is superior for dis-
couraging inefficient entry; an output maintenance rule, on the other hand, is preferable
for inducing higher pre-entry output. Second, the initial choice between a static and a
dynamic economic model as most appropriate for applied analysis will decisively effect
eventual policy conclusions. Third, both cost-based and output-based rules are difficult for
courts to apply because both involve burdensome, highly technical issues of proof. Fourth,
absence of empirical information necessitates making intuitive assumptions at crucial
points. i
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2. Proposed Long Run Pricing Rules
At least five distinct pricing rules have been proposed by eco-
nomic analysts critical of the Areeda-Turner rule. These pro-
posed rules, which are based on the long run approach, can be
categorized in three groups: (a) cost-based rules; (b) non-cost
rules; and (c) open ended rule-of-reason approach.3
a. Cost-Based Rules. Unlike the Areeda-Turner rule, long run
cost-based rules do not rely solely on cost determination. Cost re-
mains a crucial parameter, however, for these alternative rules.
The Posner Rule. Posner agrees with Areeda and Turner that
the goal of predatory pricing policy is to promote economic effi-
ciency, and that efficiency is demonstrated by cost superiority.
Thus, he believes, as do Areeda and Turner, that sales below
short run marginal cost are inherently predatory. Posner diverges
from Areeda and Turner, however, by maintaining that predation
must be measured from a long run perspective and by recogniz-
ing that predation constitutes strategic behavior deliberately de-
signed to exclude an equally efficient (or more efficient)
competitor.6
Posner accordingly proposes a presumptive rule that defines
predation as either sales below short run marginal cost, or sales
below average total cost with intent to exclude a competitor.6  The
average total cost formulation is presumptive, but rebuttable by
evidence demonstrating that changes in cost or demand have
rendered either long run marginal cost or short run marginal cost
the appropriate cost standard. Long run marginal cost is the
appropriate cost standard when the cost of replacing a plant that
must be permanently maintained to satisfy demand significantly
deviates from average total cost. On the other hand, short run
marginal cost is the appropriate cost standard-making intent
irrelevant-when the existing plant would not be replaced be-
cause of excess capacity, obsolescence, or similar factors. 6
A fourth suggested alternative is no predatory pricing rule. See R. BORK, supra note
6, at 154. Even Professor McGee, who rejects most predatory pricing rules, dismisses this
as a nonviable alternative. See McGee, 23 J.L. & ECON., supra note 6, at 317.
6 See R. POSNER, supra note 11, at 188-91.
I Greer also favors the latter standard-sales below average total cost with intent to
exclude. See Greer, A Critique of Areeda and Turner's Standard for Predatory Practices, 24
ANTITRUST BULL. 233, 242-52 (1979).
66 Posner adds, somewhat tentatively, that the rule might restrain overzealous prosecu-
tion by "requir[ing] the plaintiff to prove that the relevant market has characteristics pre-
disposing it toward the effective use of predatory pricing." See R. POSNER, supra note 11, at
191. Such characteristics would include monopolistic market structure (high return to pre-
dation) and greater diversification of the dominant firm (demonstration effect). Id.
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The Joskow-Klevorick Rule. Emphasizing that predatory pricing
is profitable only in non-competitive markets, Joskow and Klevor-
ick propose a two-tiered predatory pricing test.67  The first tier
requires a fmding that monopolistic conditions exist in the rel-
evant predatory pricing market; the second tier requires a de-
tailed assessment of the alleged predatory pricing conduct. First
tier analysis requires an assessment of market structure and per-
formance, including short run monopoly power, the condition of
entry, and certain dynamic factors, such as innovation. The first
stage test functions as a screening device; there is no need to go
on to the second tier analysis unless monopolistic market condi-
tions exist.
Second tier analysis uses the following cost-based rules:
1. A price below average variable cost is conclusive evidence
of predation;
2. A price between average variable cost and average total
cost is presumptive evidence of predation, but this pre-
sumption may be rebutted by proof that the alleged
predator possesses substantial excess capacity which was
not caused by a deliberate exclusionary policy;
3. A price reduction that is followed by a price increase with-
in two years is presumptive evidence of predation, and
this presumption holds even if the price is above average
total cost.6"
Other evidence, particularly 'relating to predatory intent, is rel-
evant under the second and third rules.69
b. Non-cost-Based Rules. The Williamson and Baumol rules
described below rely substantially or entirely on non-cost factors.
The Williamson Rule. As previously noted,7 Williamson fo-
cuses on predatory pricing conduct involving the use of the domi-
nant firm's excess productive capacity. The dominant firm,
according to Williamson, can frustrate entry by maintaining, prior
to entry, a level of capacity at which its optimal scale of produc-
tion exceeds its present level lof output. Thus, at current output
levels, marginal cost is far below short run average cost; and if the
67 See Joskow & Klevorick, supra note, 50, at 242-59.
68 Id. at 250-55. This approach is similar to the Baumol rule. See note 74 and accom-
panying text infra. For a discussion of the impact of inflation and other changes in costs on
the application of this rule, see text accompanying notes 118-19, 123 infra.
6' Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 50, at 259. Although they classify their analysis as a
rule-of-reason approach, Joskow and Klevorick's reliance on cost-based presumptive rules
supports its classification as a cost-based approach. The classification label, however, is not
essential to this analysis.
70 See footnotes 56-62 and accompanying text supra.
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dominant firm increases output, its short run average cost will
decrease. If entry occurs under these conditions, the dominant
firm can eliminate the entrant by either maintaining or, if neces-
sary, expanding output to a level that will force price below the
entrant's average cost but not below the dominant firm's marginal
cost.
The Williamson model is designed to reveal the perverse in-
centive for a dominant firm, subject to a cost-based pricing rule,
to build an uneconomically large plant as a weapon against new
entry. To counter this tendency, Williamson proposes a system of
rules that prevents a dominant firm from increasing output for a
limited period of time after entry.7' Although their structure is
rather complex, Williamson's rules, in effect, prevent a dominant
firm faced with new entry from expanding output for a period of
eighteen months, and from selling below full cost over the long
run.72 These rules are particularly sensitive to the new entrant or
small expanding firm, and are effectively more permissive for
dominant firm pricing in competition with established rivals.73
The Baumol Rule. Baumol rejects cost-based rules because
they fail to achieve allocative efficiency in pricing. Although the
economic theory he relies on is extremely complex, the rule
Baumol proposes is perhaps the simplest of all predatbry pricing
rules. His rule would permit the dominant firm to reduce price
freely in the face of competition or new entry, but if that price
reduction forces an entrant or existing smaller firm to leave the
market, the dominant firm could not increase price for several
7' See Williamson, supra note 48, at 331-37.
712 McGee has pointed out that expansion by a dominant firm in the face of entry is
consistent with an alternative model of firm behavior (called the "dominant firm" model)
in which there is no predatory intent. In this model the dominant firm accepts the supply
function of the entrants as beyond its control and simply maximizes profits over that part
of the demand which remains available. The resulting output of the dominant firm may be
greater than, less than, or equal to its pre-entry output depending on the shape of the
relevant demand and supply functions. Hence, if the dominant firm model is plausible, it
is not possible to infer from a post-entry expansion of output that predatory behavior of
the type modeled by Williamson has necessarily occurred. See McGee, 23 J.L. & ECON.,
supra note 6, at 324.
7s In the case of established rivals, the output restriction rule is inapplicable, and the
pricing restriction rule applies only when the industry is at least a loose oligopoly and the
price reductions are not merely episodic or temporary. When such conditions prevail,
prices are predatory if (1) they are less than average total cost in the intermediate run
(except under conditions of excess capacity), or (2) if they are less than full costs over the
long run. If excess capacity exists, prices are predatory when they are below average vari-
able cost. See Williamson, supra note 48, at 321-23, 336-37.
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years thereafter (except if justified by increased costs or other
economic conditions).74  I
Baumol's rule is designed to prevent a firm from cutting
price below a level it cannot maintain on a long term basis. The
dominant firm, presumably aware of its own costs, is unlikely to
set a price below its full costs of production. Hence, the rule seeks
to protect an equally efficient entrant from predation. In addi-
tion, this rule provides the dominant firm with the freedom to
reduce prices, thus promoting allocational efficiency and assuring
maximum responsiveness to consumer demand.
c. Rule-of-Reason Approach. Scherer perceives deficiencies in
all mechanical standards for predation, whether based on cost or
non-cost factors 5 arguing that the only viable rule for predatory
pricing is a "rule-of-reason" inquiry into all relevant variables.
Scherer's rejection of more limited approaches is based on his
conclusion that the Areeda-Turner marginal cost pricing rule, as
applied to the large scale entrant, produces perverse effects. The
marginal cost rule, according to Scherer, allows a dominant firm
to preclude entry by setting pre-entry output at a sufficiently high
level so that additional post-entry output forces price below cost.
Alternatively, Scherer argues that a rigid marginal cost pricing
rule will force a dominant firm to reduce output following entry,
thereby discouraging beneficial pre-entry output expansions, as
well as predatory price reductions by dominant firms.
It is easier to articulate what the rule-of-reason approach re-
jects than what it includes. Scherer calls for a "thorough examina-
tion of the factual circumstances," 7 7 particularly of intent and the
structural consequences of the alleged predatory behavior. More
explicitly, he states that the relevant variables should include
the relative cost positions of the monopolist and fringe firms,
the scale of entry required to secure minimum costs, whether
fringe firms are driven out entirely or merely suppressed,
whether the monopolist expands its output to replace the out-
put of excluded rivals or restricts supply again when the rivals
withdraw, and whether any long-run compensatory expansion
74 See Baumol, Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions: A Policy for Prevention of Predatory
Priing, 89 YALE L.J. 1 (1979). 1
15 Professor Schmalensee also rejects mechanical standards. See Schmalensee, On the Use
of Economic Models in Antitrust: The ReaLemon Case, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 994, 1028-31
(1979).
76 See Scherer, supra note 45, at 873-75. See generally F. SCHERER, supra note 1, at 537-38
and Appendix A, infra.
" Scherer, supra note 45, at 890.
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by the monopolist entails investment in scale economy-
embodying new plant.7
8
Areeda and Turner have criticized this approach as unworkable.79
II
JUDICIAL APPLICATIONS OF ECONOMIC
PREDATORY PRICING THEORIES
The courts face a formidable burden when they formulate
legal policy from the widely varying economic theories of preda-
tory pricing. The purpose of Part II is to assist in closing the gap
between economic theory and courtroom proof. This analysis pro-
vides added insight into the viability of alternative predatory pric-
ing rules-a prerequisite not only to formulating current legal
approaches, but also to assessing trends of future development.
Part II summarizes the post-1975 developments in legal
standards for predatory pricing, outlining the legal rules that
have emerged in the lower courts and their relation to current
economic theories. Two testing fact situations, drawn from recent
cases, are then presented to probe the meaning and implications
of the economic theories as directly applied to specific facts. Pro-
jections based on this analysis suggest the direction of future de-
velopments and provide a framework for general observations on
the legal and economic issues raised by predatory pricing. 0
A. Basic Legal Standards
1. Background: The Pre-1975 Standard
The pre-1975 legal standard for predatory pricing hinged on
two factors-unfair use of pricing power against new entrants or
smaller firms, and protection of long run market competitiveness
viewed primarily in terms of market structure. Economic effi-
ciency was not specifically articulated as a legal policy goal. Preda-
78 Id. (footnote omitted). For a judicial interpretation of the Scherer standard, see Pa-
cific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790, 797 n.8 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 879 (1977): "[The Scherer factors] primarily concern whether the monopolist will
be able to restrict output, reap monopoly profits, and leave residual demand unsatisfied,
and ... become so entrenched through barriers to entry that it can never be dislodged."
79 See Areeda & Turner, Scherer on Predatory Pricing: A Reply, 89 HARV. L. REv. 891,
896-97 (1976).
' Projection and observations as to the future must, of course, be tempered by the fact
that the Supreme Court has declined to review any of the post-1975 predatory pricing
cases.
1981] 765
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66:738
tory pricing might be held to violate either the Robinson-Patman
Act or the Sherman Act 8' even though the legal standards under
the two statutes were not identical."2 Unfairness was emphasized
under the Robinson-Patman Act,s3 while structural competitive-
ness was stressed under the Sherman Act.8 4  Notwithstanding
these differences, there was basis for viewing the proscriptions
against predatory pricing under both Acts as promoting a similar
goal-the establishment of 'competitive markets in the long run
by protecting new entrants and smaller firms in the short run.8 5
Consistent with this view, the courts before 1975 identified a
pricing scheme as predatory when they found: (1) monopolistic
power or large size advantage of the predator firm; (2) for a firm
serving several geographic or related product markets, a pricing
differential between the predator's "monopoly" market and its
competitive market; (3) sales below average total cost in the com-
petitive market; (4) injury or exclusion of smaller competitors or
new entrants as a result of such pricing; and (5) intent of the
predator firm to exclude oridiscipline rivals. The relative impor-
tance of these prerequisites-all relevant in any predatory pricing
81 See notes 35-36 supra.
82 Under the Robinson-Patman Act, the issue is whether seller price discrimination in-
jured competition at the seller's level. See, e.g., Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386
U.S. 685 (1967). Under the Sherman Act, the issue is whether the predator firm has
monopolized or attempted to monopolize a defined market. See, e.g., United States v. Grin-
nell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966). The two standards, of course, overlap.
Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 702 (1967). In Utah Pie, the
Court admonished the appellate court for
plac[ing] heavy emphasis on the fact that Utah Pie [the firm that charged its
rivals with unlawful price discrimination] constantly increased its sales volume
and continued to make a profit. .. [W]e disagree with [the] view that there is
no reasonably possible injury to competition as long as the volume of sales in a
particular market is expanding and at least some of the competitors in the
market continue to operate at a profit.
Id.; accord, National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 412 F.2d 605, 618 (7th Cir. 1969) (commis-
sion warranted in finding that "petitioner failed to use its competitive power fairly").
W' e have said enough about the great hold that the defendants have on this
market. The percentage [89%] is so high as to justify the finding of monopoly.
And, as the facts already related indicate, this monopoly was achieved in large
part by unlawful and exclusionary practices .... Pricing practices that con-
tained competitors were [one example].
United States v. Grinnel Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 576 (1966). This emphasis on structural
factors is consistent with the need to demonstrate the existence of a monopoly in the
relevant market to sustain a violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act based on monopolizing
conduct. Id. at 570-71.
s5 Cf. Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. at 699-700 (competitor who is
forced to lower prices in face of predation eventually becomes less effective competitive
force).
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case-depended upon whether the claim arose under the Sher-
man Act or the Robinson-Patman Act."6
2. The Current Legal Standards
The pre-1975 legal standard produced lengthy and complex
litigations. Moreover, the Robinson-Patman Act was repeatedly
criticized for protecting inefficient competitors at the expense of
consumers. 7  It was in this setting that Areeda and Turner pro-
posed their marginal cost pricing rule in 1975. In place of a com-
plex and increasingly controversial doctrine, the Areeda-Turner
rule offered a simple, bright-line standard purportedly grounded
in basic economic theory. Under the assumptions of the
elementary short run pricing model, it was analytically true that
marginal cost pricing was socially optimal economic behavior.
Thus, it logically followed that only a price below marginal cost
should be condemned as predatory. There were, of course, prac-
tical problems in ascertaining marginal cost because it could not
be derived simply from a firm's accounting statments. ss But
Areeda and Turner urged that courts needed only to substitute
average variable cost as a proxy for marginal cost to overcome
that difficulty. Thus, the marginal cost/average variable cost
standard seemingly offered a simple solution to the perplexities of
predatory pricing founded on the assurances of economic
science. 9
a. Judicial Reservations. Following the 1975 article by Areeda
and Turner, the courts initially embraced the marginal cost pric-
86 See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966) (Sherman Act); Continental
Baking Co. v. Old Homestead Bread Co., 476 F.2d 97 (10th Cir. 1973) (Robinson-Patman
Act); National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. FTC, 412 F.2d 605 (7th Cir. 1969) (Robinson-Patman
Act); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd
per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (Sherman Act).
87 See C. EDWARDS, THE PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAW 630 (1959); Elman, The Robinson-
Patman Act and Antitrust Policy: A Time for Reappraisal, 42 WASH. L. REV. 1, 4-9 (1966).
' Indeed, proponents of the marginal cost rule apparently ignored the extended his-
tory of adverse experience with the cost-justification provision of the Robinson-Patman
Act. See Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61, 68 (1953) ("elusiveness of cost data");
ADVISORY COMM. ON COST JUSTIFICATION, REPORT TO THE FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N (1956);
F. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT 266 (1962) (cost justi-
fication "complex and frustrating in practice"); H. TAGGART, COST JUSTIFICATION (1959).
See generally Fuchs, The Requirement of Exactness in the Justification of Price and Service Differen-
tials Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 30 TEXAS L. REv. 1 (1951).
' At least one commentator suggested the possibility of using a marginal cost/average
variable cost standard for predatory pricing as early as 1965. See McGee, Some Economic
Issues in Robinson-Patman Land, 30 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 530, 549 (1965) (brief reference
to average variable cost as possible predatory pricing standard). Areeda and Turner,
however, are responsible for the first developed proposal advocating the marginal cost
standard in predatory pricing cases.
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ing rule, but subsequently pulled back in the face of increasing
economic criticism and litigation difficulties. Several factors influ-
enced this judicial retreat. First, the marginal cost rule proved
more difficult to apply than anticipated. Cost determination-
however cost is defined-is an inherently complex matter for
proof in a legal proceeding. In addition, it became clear that aver-
age variable cost was an imperfect proxy for marginal cost. Addi-
tional complex adjustments were required to prevent results
grossly at variance with the economic theory underlying the mar-
ginal cost standard. Second, Courts experienced difficulty applying
the economic concepts involved in the marginal cost standard.
Some judges, perhaps, only partly understood these concepts and
thus made analytical economic errors.!" Because the more precise
marginal cost standard removed the flexibility inherent in the
fairness and reasonableness criteria that had been previously
used, such errors could be result-decisive.9 Third, and perhaps
most serious, the apparent economic consensus dissolved. As dis-
cussed in Part I, several economic writers rejected the short run
marginal cost rule, even on efficiency grounds, and proposed
alternative rules. Consequently, courts faced a bewildering array
of possible economic standards. Finally, it became clear that the
change to the marginal cost standard strongly favored defendants.
The Areeda-Turner rule allowed courts to reverse jury findings
favorable to plaintiffs and to enter directed verdicts for de-
fendants. Indeed, no plaintiff has yet prevailed under the
Areeda-Turner rule, and the rule has been called "a defendant's
paradise." 9 2 As a result, no single legal standard prevails in the
lower federal courts-a situation apparently accepted by the Su-
90 See, e.g., Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352, 1358 n.6 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977) (court erred in stating that pricing below average variable cost
justified by acceptable business reasonsi because this price level is below shut-down point);
Williams Inglis & Son Baking Co. v. ITT Contintental Baking Co., 461 F. Supp. 410, 418
(N.D. Cal. 1978) (court incorrectly claimed that excess capacity necessarily results in AVC
exceeding MC; this occurs only at exceedingly low levels of production approaching shut-
down point); Weber v. Wynne, 431 F. Supp. 1048, 1059 (D.N.J. 1977) (direct labor classi-
fled as fixed cost instead of variable cost).
" See, e.g., William Inglis & Son Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 461 F.
Supp. 410 (N.D. Cal. 1978).
"I Williamson, supra note 48, at 305. See Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Basic Re-
sources, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 63,947, at 75,887 (S.D. Ohio, April 7, 1981)
(quoting Williamson); Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 481 F. Supp. 965, 995 (N.D.
Cal. 1979) (same). But cf. Borden, Inc.! 92 F.T.C. 669, 815, [1976-1979 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) $ 21,490, at 21,516 (1978) (Clanton, Comm'r, concurring)
(although Areeda-Turner standard violated by price reductions, majority held conduct un-
lawful on other grounds).
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preme Court, which has repeatedly denied certiorari in predatory
pricing cases. 3
b. Three Alternative Legal Approaches. With minor semantic
variations, the legal standards enunciated by the courts since 1975
fall into three categories:
1. The marginal cost standard. Pricing below marginal cost or
average variable cost is unlawful; pricing above marginal cost or
average variable cost is lawful. This is the Areeda-Turner rule.",
2. Augmented marginal cost standards. Although pricing below
marginal cost remains unlawful, pricing above marginal cost may
also be unlawful under the following conditions:
a. The high entry barriers exception: Pricing above marginal
cost is unlawful when entry barriers are "extemely high" and
the price is below the "short run profit maximizing price." 15
b. The marginal cost-plus-other-factors standard: Pricing
above marginal cost is unlawful when other probative factors
demonstrate that the price is predatory; these factors may in-
clude intent, limit pricing, non-price predation, and entry
barriers.96
3. The average total cost standard. Pricing below average total
cost or "full cost" (average cost plus capital return) is unlawful
when, in light of all facts, the price is unreasonable or predatory.97
"3 See, e.g., Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848 (9th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978); Pacific Eng'r Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d
790 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977); International Air Indus., Inc. v. American
Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976).
" See Robert's Waikiki U-Drive, Inc. v. Budget Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc., 491 F. Supp.
1199, 1221-22 (D. Haw. 1980); Murphy Tugboat Co. v. Crowley, 454 F. Supp. 847, 853-56
(N.D. Cal. 1978); Weber v. Wynne, 431 F. Supp. 1048, 1058-59 (D.N.J. 1977).
" See note 16 supra. In Borden, Inc., 92 F.T.C. 669, 823-24, [1976-1979 Transfer
Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) $ 21,490, at 21,520 (1978) (Pitofsky, Comm'r, concurring),
a possible variation from this standard was advocated that would apply when entry barriers
are based on decisive advertising and promotional cost advantages. If these advantages
exist, Commissioner Pitofsky argued that the pricing standard should be average total cost
rather than the short run profit maximizing price. Pitofsky supported this claim by relying
on the high entry barriers exception.
96 See Chillicothe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 615 F.2d 427 (7th Cir.
1980); California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 717 (9th Cir. 1979); Pa-
cific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 879 (1977). The Pacific Eng'r court used language that could be construed as an
outright rejection of a cost-based test. 551 F.2d at 797. This language, however, was
accompanied by a discussion of facts demonstrating that the alleged predator's price was
above marginal cost. Thus, the issue in this case was actually similar to that of other cases
utilizing the marginal cost plus other factors test-whether additional factors may be intro-
duced to challenge as predatory a price above marginal cost. See id.
7 See Barry Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., No. 78-485-S, slip op. at 16-17 (D.
Mass., Feb. 26, 1981); Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Basic Resources, Inc., 5 TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) 63,947 (S.D. Ohio April 7, 1981); Transamerica Computer Co. v.
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c. Connecting Economic Theories to Legal Standards. To under-
stand the impact of the economic theories of predation, it is
necessary to relate them to the various legal standards. The mar-
ginal cost standard, which is derived from the non-linear cost
model of Figure 2, virtually incorporates the Areeda-Turner
rule." Other economic theories, although frequently relying on
the concept, do not view marginal cost as the single criterion for
predatory pricing.9
The "high entry barriers exception," which defines a price as
predatory if it is below the short run profit maximizing level and
if entry barriers are extremely high, is based on the simple, linear
cost model of Figure 1. The problem in applying this legal stan-
dard is that the presence of its two preconditions-high entry
barriers and pricing below the short run profit maximizing
level-is difficult to ascertain. Economic theories provide limited
assistance in determining when entry barriers are high. Indeed,
only Joskow and Klevorick explicity suggest criteria for ascertain-
ing entry barriers.1 0 Although their discussion is sound in
theory, it provides little help to courts that are actually faced with
determining whether entry barriers are high. 0'
IBM Corp., 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979); 0. Hommel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 472 F.
Supp. 793 (W.D. Pa. 1979); Borden Inc., 92 F.T.C. 669, 987 [1976-1979 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,490 (1978 . But see Pierce Packing Co. v. John Morrell & Co.,
633 F.2d 1362, 1367 (9th Cir. 1980) (Transamerica interpreted as allowing consideration of
non-price factors only when "direct proof of specific intent or direct proof of a dangerous
probability of success" exists).
' Although they have adopted the basic tenets of the Areeda-Turner theory, several
courts have not accorded it the per se qualities envisaged by the authors. See Hanson v.
Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352, 1359 n.6 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977)
(pricing below average variable cost only establishes prima facie case of predation); Inter-
national Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 724-25 n.31 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976) (when entry barriers are high, apply short run
profit maximizing standard). The refusal to accord the Areeda-Turner rule per se qual-
ities, however, has little practical effect; plaintiffs have uniformly failed to prevail when-
ever the court adopted some form of the Areeda-Turner standard. Cf. Borden, Inc.. 92
F.T.C. 669 & n.29, [1976-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,490 (1978)
(FTC grants relief to plaintiff after specifically declining to adopt the'Areeda-Tumer standard
as the exclusive or even the preferred test for predatory pricing).
" The rules proposed by Posner, Scherer, and Joskow & Klevorick generally permit
marginal cost (or average variable cost) pricing under conditions of excess capacity. See text
accompanying notes 64-66 (Posner), 70-72 (Joskow & Klevorick), and 75-78 (Scherer) supra.
'o See Joskow and Klevorick, supra note 50, at 227-31.
a Under the Joskow and Klevorick approach, "conditions of entry" (entry barriers)
must be assessed before determining whether a market is monopolistic. This assessment of
entry barriers requires an extensive inquiry into such issues as concentration, demand elas-
ticity, and response of potential competition to prices above competitive level. It is unlikely,
however, that the courts could feasibly undertake an inquiry into entry conditions at this
level of sophistication.
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Economic theory is more useful in ascertaining whether the
second requirement of the high entry barriers exception is met-
a price below the short run profit maximizing level. Although the
courts have prescribed no clear test, Baumol suggests an effective
approach. Under the Baumol rule, predation is indicated by the
subsequent reversal of an earlier price reduction when not justi-
fied by external changes in the economic environment (e.g.,
changes in cost or demand).02 It follows that unless the subse-
quent price increase can be explained by new economic develop-
ments, the previous price was necessarily below the firm's profit
maximizing level. Thus, an unjustified reversal of a price reduc-
tion provides an effective test for discovering pricing below the
profit maximizing level.'0
Under the marginal-cost-plus-other-factors standard, as re-
cently enunciated by two circuits,'0 marginal cost, although an im-
portant factor in the legal standard, must be considered along
with "other relevant factors." 105 The courts that have used the
marginal-cost-plus-other-factors standard have cited most of the
previously discussed economic theorists, thus demonstrating that
the full range of economic theories is relevant for argumentation
when this standard is applied.
The average total cost standard offers almost as much free-
dom to incorporate varying economic theories. Average total cost
is a key factor in all theories except Areeda and Turner's. Thus,
Probably, the only test for entry barriers suitable for judicial use is the actual frequency
or infrequency of entry in an industry. See 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 18,
917b; Brodley, Potential Competition Mergers: A Structural Synthesis, 87 YALE L.J. 1, 79 &
n.327 (1977). Lack of entry, however, is potentially explained by factors other than high
entry barriers; thus, this test alone is not sufficient proof of the actual entry conditions.
101 See text accompanying note 74 supra.
"I In International Air Indus., Inc. v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714, 725 n.34
(5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1976), the trial court considered testimony by the
alleged predator's sales manager that price had been set at a profit maximizing level..This
approach, however, is highly unsatisfactory because a business manager could "truthfully"
testify that any price designed to eliminate competitors was profit maximizing. In Borden,
Inc., 92 F.T.C. 669, 826-31, [1976-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
21,490, at 21,522-24 (1978) (concurring), Commissioner Pitofsky, in rejecting the average
variable cost rule, inferred from the facts of this case that sales below average total cost
were below the profit maximizing level. Sales below average total cost, however, do not
conclusively demonstrate a non-profit maximizing price. If market demand has fallen, the
short run profit maximizing (or loss minimizing) point may be below average total cost.
,o See Chillicothe Sand & Gravel Co. v. Martin Marietta Corp., 615 F.2d 427, 432 (7th
Cir. 1980); California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727, 743 (9th Cir.
1979).
" Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790, 797 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977) (other factors to be considered when facts justify).
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the economic issues raised by the average total cost standard are
similar to those raised by the marginal-cost-plus-other-factors
standard. The only economic difference is the starting point for
analysis. Under the marginal-cost-plus-other-factors standard,
marginal cost is the starting point for analysis; the average total
cost standard analysis, on the other hand, begins with average to-
tal cost. In both cases the cost standard may be augmented by
similar extrinsic evidence of predation. It is conceivable, neverthe-
less, that the average total cost standard would give greater prom-
inence to evidence of intent. This tendency is evident in some
judicial decisions,0 6 and at least one economic writer has explicitly
coupled proof of intent with an average total cost test. 07 In
general, however, the economic theories relevant to the average
total cost standard are similar to those for the marginal-cost-plus-
other-factors standard. 08
B. Application of Economic Theories
The best way to understand the impact of the various eco-
nomic theories and rules is to examine their application in a speci-
fic factual setting. This section analyzes such applications in two
distinct factual situations. Case 1 involves price reductions under
conditions of weak demand and chronic excess capacity. Case 2
involves price cutting in response to multiple entry by smaller
firms under sustained competition in a high technology industry.
In each case, a discussion of the basic facts is followed by a sum-
mary of judicial rulings on similar facts. The applications of eco-
nomic analysis and the various economic rules to these facts are
then outlined and compared.
106 See, e.g., Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 481 F. Supp. 965, 996
(N.D. Cal. 1979) (intent evidence relevant to establish reasonableness of price below aver-
age total cost); Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Basic Resources, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP.
(CCH) 63,947, at 75,887-88 & n.9 (S.D. Ohio April 7, 1981) (intent evidence as explana-
tory of whether pricing below average total cost is predatory). See also Barry Wright Corp.
v. ITT Grinnell Corp., No. 78-485-S, slip op. at 16-17 (D. Mass., Feb. 26, 1981); 0. Hom-
mel Co. v. Ferro Corp., 471 F. Supp. 793 (W.D. Pa. 1979); Borden, Inc., 92 F.T.C. 669,
805, [1976-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,490, at 21,510 (1978).
" See R. POSNER, supra note 11, at 189-90.
'0' Whether an alleged predator is better off under the marginal-cost-plus, or average
total cost rules depends upon the strength of market demand in relation to cost. When
demand is weak (line D 2D2 in Figure 3)1 and excess capacity exists, a predator firm will
benefit from the marginal cost rule because price often falls below average cost but re-
mains above marginal cost in this situation. The situation is reversed, however, when de-
mand is strong (line DID, in Figure 3). The predator firm benefits from application of the
average total cost rule in this situation because price may fall below marginal cost but
remain above average cost.
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1. CASE 1: Dominant Firm Pricing with Excess Capacity
a. Basic Facts. In 1961 there were four manufacturers of the
chemical oxidizer used in solid rocket fuel. For nine years, the
manufacturers engaged in severe price competition, usually initi-
ated by the dominant firm, and by 1970 only one other firm, in
addition to the dominant firm, remained in the market. During
this nine year period, prices fell from thirty-five cents per pound
to fifteen cents per pound-well below the dominant firm's aver-
age total cost but still above its average variable cost. Even though
the fifteen cents per pound price was in effect for only a brief
period, the overall price level remained below average total cost
for seven years. Demand also fell sharply during this nine year
period due to the technological replacement of solid fuel with
liquid fuel. This created so much excess capacity that the domi-
nant firm was capable of supplying, by itself, the entire market.
Although in a technological sense it had no cost advantage over
its rivals, the dominant firm's costs continuously fell over the
range of the now reduced market output. These scale economies,
combined with its increasing market share, inevitably led to lower
average variable and total costs for the dominant firm. After two
firms terminated their operations, the lone remaining competitor
commenced litigation alleging an unlawful attempt to monopolize
and monopolization. The competitor firm argued that the domi-
nant firm's surveillance of the competitor, its opposition before
government agencies to the competitor's attempt to classify itself
as a small business eligible for special benefits under federal law,
and its statements indicating that it would raise price after the
competitor left the market demonstrated the dominant firm's
predatory intent. In addition, the dominant firm was a large, di-
versified firm whereas the competitor was undiversified and thin-
ly capitalized. Customers who were unhappy with the prospect of
dependence on a single firm for rocket fuel supplies offered eco-
nomic support to the competitor, but to no avail. Only a govern-
ment subsidy prevented the competitor's departure from the mar-
ket.
b. Judicial Ruling. Ruling on similar facts, the Tenth Circuit
reversed a lower court finding for the plaintiff and entered judg-
ment for the defendant.'"' Applying the Areeda-Turner test, the
court found that the dominant firm's prices were above both its
average variable cost and marginal cost and thus were non-
109 Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 879 (1977).
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predatory under the marginal cost rule."' The court did not,
however, base its holding solely on the marginal cost test. It also
scrutinized the record for other relevant factors that might dem-
onstrate that the dominant firm's conduct was anticompetitive in
the long run."' The court found no such factors, noting that this
was not a case of short run price cutting to earn monopoly profits
in the long run, because the low price persisted for seven years.
The court reasoned that under this condition of chronic excess
capacity, marginal cost pricing below full cost was inevitable and,
indeed, was economically desirable because it freed the industry
of wasteful excess capacity.
c. Applying Economic Theories. This section considers the ap-
plication of the previously discussed economic rules to the specific
facts of Case 1. The facts are analyzed from the litigant's perspec-
tive and arguments for both plaintiffs (competitor firms) and de-
fendants (dominant firms) are outlined. Because judicial applica-
tion of most of the proposed rules is limited or nonexistent, the
following analysis plows new ground." 2
The Areeda-Turner Rule. The Areeda-Turner rule clearly indi-
cates that the pricing in Case 1 should be held lawful because it
was above both marginal cost and average variable cost (the proxy
for marginal cost). Indeed, Areeda and Turner endorse the result
in Case 1. They consider pricing below full cost justified under a
condition of excess capacity, reasoning that such pricing is doubly
beneficial because it rids the industry of excess productive capac-
ity and lowers immediate production costs."3
The clarity and simplicity of this analysis is possible, however,
only because the dominant firm's price was above both marginal
cost and average variable cost. This is not inevitable in every case.
Particularly when excess capacity exists, price may be above only
one of these two cost measurements. A potentially troublesome
problem arises when price is either below marginal cost but above
average variable cost, or above marginal cost but below average
variable cost."4  In both situations, the price is economically un-
1o Id. at 797.
1 Id.
"* But see E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., - F.T.C. __, 3 T.ADE REG. REP. (CCH)
21,770, at 21,980-81 (Oct. 20, 1980) (analysis of predatory pricing facts under several eco-
nomic theories).
"' See 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 18, 715a.
,14 In the first instance, when price isi below marginal cost but above average variable
cost, average variable cost creates a price floor that is too low and thus theoretically unjusti-
fied. Acknowledging this problem, Areed a and Turner require the monopolist that relies
on a defense of price above average variable cost to demonstrate that marginal cost did not
774 [Vol. 66:738
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justified and will usually be unlawful under the Areeda-Turner
rule. Thus, under conditions of excess capacity, the Areeda-
Turner rule requires the plaintiff to ascertain both marginal cost
and average variable cost in order to demonstrate the illegality of
a particular price.
The Posner Rule. The Posner rule defines as predatory a price
either below short run marginal cost or below long run marginal
cost when accompanied by an intent to exclude an equally effi-
cient competitor. The facts of Case 1 could support a finding of
intent to exclude.1 ' Thus, the chief issue in this case under the
Posnr rule is the proper measure of cost. Because there was ex-
cess capacity, short run marginal cost might appear to be the
appropriate standard. As Posner notes, it makes no sense to re-
quire a producer to charge customers for depreciation of a plant
that it will never replace."6 But is it correct to assume that no
portion of the plant will ever be replaced? Suppose there is some
permanent level of demand that will continue indefinitely. The
issue then is whether the current level of output physically depre-
ciates on capacity that is needed over the long run."7 If so, rev-
enues from 'incremental output should cover long run marginal
cost. In that event, long run marginal cost, not short run marginal
cost as Posner suggests in the case of excess capacity, should be-
come the appropriate cost standard.
Such an argument by a plaintiff, if justified by the facts,
appears theoretically sound. The defendant can respond, how-
"significantly exceed" average variable cost at that output. Id. 715d, at 176. On the other
hand, when price is below average variable cost but above marginal cost, the marginal cost
floor is too low because price has fallen below the shut-down point, i.e., the minimum point
on the average variable cost curve. No price below the shut-down point, even when above
marginal cost, is economically justified because the firm's full current revenues no longer
cover its full current costs. A firm will minimize losses at this point only by shutting down.
The court in William Inglis & Son Baking Co. v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 461 F.
Supp. 410, 418-19 (N.D. Cal. 1978), overlooked this point by holding that a price below
average variable cost is not unlawful unless it is also below marginal cost. The Inglis hold-
ing thus effectively sanctions pricing below the shut-down level. This conclusion is easily
verified by referring to Figures 2 and 3 supra.
"' Indeed, the lower court, in ruling for the plaintiff, made such a finding. Pacific Eng'r
Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d at 794-95.
"1 See R. POSNER, supra note 11, at 189.
"' The following simple example will illustrate this point. Assume that current capacity
is 100 units but that over the long run only 25 units of capacity will be retained. If desired
current output is 60 units, it can be produced without depreciating any portion of retained
capacity. An efficient price in this situation need cover only variable costs. If, in contrast,
desired current output is 80 units, then it will be necessary to utilize a portion of capacity
which is to be retained. Assuming that use of capacity results in some physical depredation
of the capacity which would otherwise be usable in future periods, the true cost of the
"marginal" unit must include the depreciation of capital, i.e., long run marginal cost.
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ever, by arguing that a feasible legal standard cannot possibly rest
on the assessment of future market demand and that assessment
of demand is required by the conclusion that a portion of the
plant is to be replaced. Thus, a more detailed and discriminating
classification for the excess capacity case than that suggested by
Posner is impractical.
The Baumol Rule. Under the Baumol rule, a price reduction is
predatory if, following such reduction, one or more firms leave
the market and the dominant firm subsequently raises its price.
The first condition of the Baumol rule is satisfied because two
firms left the market during the period of price reductions (and
the third firm arguably left the market as well because it was kept
in business only by a government subsidy). One firm left the mar-
ket when the price dropped to 14.92 cents." 8 After that firm
ceased operations, prices increased to between fifteen and twenty
cents, although they were generally below 18.25 cents. The plain-
tiff competitor firm remained in the market, and was ultimately
saved by a government plan that divided the market between the
surviving firms at a profitable price. Thus, application of the
Baumol rule in this situation iturns on whether the modest price
increase that followed the demise of one firm was justified. The
plaintiff benefits in several ways by demonstrating a violation us-
ing the Baumol rule. First, cost determination becomes unneces-
sary. Second, the economic rationale behind the Baumol rule-to
assure that the natural monopolist supplies the market at the
lowest maintainable price- specifically addresses the natural
monopoly condition in Case 1. Third, as discussed in more detail
below, the Baumol theory provides a basis for arguing predation
under other economic theories.
The defendant dominant firm can refute application of the
Baumol rule by arguing that changes in cost and demand fully
justify the modest price increase, and more fundamentally that
the Baumol theory is unsuitable in predatory pricing cases. The
first argument is purely factual. Inflationary factors alone, for ex-
ample, may justify the moderately higher price. The second argu-
ment, pertaining to the general unsuitability of the Baumol rule,
is based on the administrative difficulties inherent in a standard
that defines allowable price in terms of future estimates of cost
and demand. Donald Turner believes that the Baumol rule forces
n The other firm ceased operations inI the preceding year before price declined to the
low point of 14.92 cents. Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d at 792.
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courts to assume a " 'quasi' price regulatory role." I,9 Although
Baumol has offered a rebuttal,' this objection may nevertheless
persuade overburdened courts. Commentators have made several
additional, but less significant, criticisms of the Baumol rule.12'
The Joskow-Klevorick Rule. Plaintiff's theory under the Joskow-
Klevorick rule is subtle but nevertheless fully comports with the
spirit of the rule. The Joskow-Klevorick rule states that dominant
firm price reductions in monopolistic markets are presumptively
predatory under any of three conditions. The first condition-
pricing below average variable cost-is not pertinent to the facts
of Case 1. The second condition-pricing below average total
cost-is present in Case 1. Pricing below average total cost is ex-
cused, however, under conditions of excess capacity as long as
price remains above average variable cost and the price reduction
maximizes short run profits. These exceptions are relevant to
Case 1 because the industry involved was plagued with excess
capacity. In Case 1, the first exception- pricing above average
variable cost-is met because price in fact remained above aver-
age variable cost. The second exception-short run profit max-
imizing at the reduced price-is not explicitly defined by Joskow
and Klevorick but can be given meaning under their third condi-
11 See Baumol, supra note 74, at 6 n.18 (letter from Donald F. Turner to William J.
Baumol, Sept. 28, 1978).
Cost factors for the multi-market firm may involve difficult allocational issues. De-
mand factors are even more complex for multi-market firms because they involve a rela-
tionship between price and marginal cost that varies with the shape of the demand func-
tion. Although Baumol notes that a price change need not be justified by a "knife's-edge
criterion of ideal pricing," even a rough justification based on demand is burdensome. Id.
at 7.
"I Baumol stresses that the price change rule does not require a meticulous, dollar-for-
dollar justification such as that used under the Robinson-Patman Act cost-justification de-
fense. Instead, the rule requires only a rough showing that the cost change was "of the
same order of magnitude" as the price change. Id. at 6 n.18. A similar justification for
price increases following price reductions is also required under the Mann-Elkins Act, ch.
308, § 7, 36 Stat. 544 (1910) (current version at 49 U.S.C. § 10701 (Supp. I1 1979)). See B.
OWEN & R. B.AEIJTIGAM, THE REGtULATION GAME 163-65 (1978).
121 See 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 18, 714c2 (rule would discourage price
reductions, encourage entry of inefficient firms, and prevent price increases by monopoly
when demand has fallen); Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 50, at 256-58 (large, diversified
firm can still achieve demonstration effect in single, limited market). Joskow and Klevor-
ick's objection, however, is not applicable to the facts of Case 1. Although potentially ap-
plicable to the facts of Case 1, Areeda and Turner's objections are somewhat strained. For
example, it is difficult to condemn the Baumol rule as discouraging price reductions. The
rule is designed to discourage price increases only after a firm has left the market in the
wake of a price reduction. Similarly, it is unlikely that any firm-efficient or inefficient-is
willing to enter an industry plagued by falling demand and excess capacity such as that
depicted by Case 1.
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tion: price reductions above average total cost are presumptively
predatory if reversed within two years. The third condition states
that even the least suspect of price reductions-one that remains
above average total cost-is predatory and hence not profit max-
imizing in the short run if reversed by the dominant firm within
two years. Relying on the third Joskow-Klevorick condition, plain-
tiff could reasonably assert that the subsequent reversal of a price
below average total cost necessarily indicates that the lower price
did not maximize short run profits. Thus, the dominant firm's
pricing below average total cost in Case 1 is not excused under
the second Joskow-Klevorick condition, and the price reduction
was therefore predatory notwithstanding the existence of excess
capacity.
Defendant could refute this argument in several ways. First,
it is debatable whether the market in Case 1 satisfied the Joskow-
Klevorick prerequisite (or "first tier test") for predatory pricing-
a monopolistic market condition. It appears that the market in
Case 1 falls within an intermediate zone between markets classi-
fied as monopolistic and those classified as competitive. 22
Second, as with the Baumol rule, a presumptively unlawful price
reduction can be justified by a showing of changed economic con-
ditions. Thus, the defendant could argue that inflation or other
factors fully explain the modest price increase. Third, all of the
objections mentioned above against the Baumol rule also can be
raised against the Joskow-Klevorick rule, because it expressly in-
corporates the Baumol rule. 23
The Scherer Rule. A court applying the Scherer rule-of-reason
approach considers all factors affecting long term social welfare,
especially predatory intent. The facts of Case 1 present a solid
argument for inferring predatory intent. The dominant firm's
surveillance activities, its active opposition to the competitor firm's
application for small business assistance before a government
agency, and most significant, its expressed intention to raise price
when the competitor was eliminated all support an inference of
predatory intent. A subsequent price reversal would further
strengthen the intent argument.
1
122 This market may be accurately characterized as highly concentrated. In addition, entry
is not likely because of the large amount of excess capacity. Very little pricing power is evident,
however, because of this excess capacity. If demand strengthened, entry into the market could
occur again as it had in the past. See Pacific Eng'r &Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d
790, 791 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977).
123 Joskow and Klevorick slightly modify the Baumol rule, however, by eliminating the
condition that the victim had been forced from the market.
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The defendant dominant firm has ample opportunity under
the Scherer rule to rebut plaintiff's arguments. For example, the
defendant could argue that its activities constituted nothing more
than survival efforts in a market no longer capable of supporting
more than one firm, or that it did not initiate all of the price
changes but set its price only in response to the market level. The
subjective characteristic of intent and the weight it receives under
the Scherer rule, 'however, may substantially deter an appellate
court from upsetting a lower court's finding of predation.' 24
d. Summary. Most commentators approve the Tenth Circuit's
decision in Case 1. It seemed economically inevitable that either
the competitor firm or the dominant firm would have been
forced to leave the market. Moreover, that the excluded firm
would be the competitor appeared equally inevitable, considering
that both firms were determined to remain in the market, neither
held a cost advantage over the other, and the dominant firm pos-
sessed greater resources and staying power. Thus, the only issue
was whether unlawful predatory means hastened the inevitable.
Having examined the five economic theories that a plaintiff
could arguably invoke under the facts of Case 1, it seems clear
that plaintiff's case remains weak. Only the Scherer theory offers
an appreciable chance of success. The rule-of-reason approach is
the most favorable to the plaintiff because it places the greatest
weight on predatory intent-an issue decided in the plaintiff's
favor by the lower court. The rule-of-reason standard could be
connected with either the marginal-cost-plus-other-factors stan-
dard or the average total cost standard. The marginal-cost-plus-
other-factors standard is less favorable to a plaintiff, however, be-
cause a price level above marginal cost (or average variable cost) is
a factor favorable to a defendant even though that price may be
below average total cost. Below average total cost pricing is, of
course, an unfavorable factor under the average total cost stan-
dard. Even under the most advantageous legal standard, however,
it is unlikely that plaintiff could sustain a favorable ruling on
appeal unless it could demonstrate that the price reductions were
substantially reversed.
124 But cf. Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d at 794-95 (although
not explicitly rejecting lower court finding of predatory intent, appellate court held that
there was no violation of Sherman Act).
Although his model, which deals with the firm that strategically selects a plant size to
preclude entry by competitors, is not directly applicable to these facts, Williamson does adhere
to the average variable cost test of predation in situations of declining demand. See Williamson,
supra note 48, at 322-23.
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Other economic theories confront the plaintiff with even
more difficult problems. The Posner rule, which defines preda-
tion in terms of sales below relevant marginal cost and intent to
exclude, depends upon a proper allocation between short and
long run marginal costs. But establishing the appropriate alloca-
tion may create difficult evidentiary problems during litigation.
Neither can plaintiff find solace in the Baumol, and Joskow-
Klevorick rules, which define! predation as an unjustified reversal
of a previous price reduction; in Case 1, the modest subsequent
price increase is probably justified by cost increases. Moreover, no
judicial decision currently supports the application of either rule,
and the problematic facts of Case 1 are unlikely to provide the
basis for a new precedent. i
Thus, the exploration of various economic theories in con-
nection with Case 1 supports the Tenth Circuit's result. At the
same time, the analysis suggests that, despite the distressed condi-
tion of the market, the strong conclusion that predation was ab-
sent depends upon the fact that the price reduction was not sub-
stantially reversed. If in fact the price reduction had been substan-
tially reversed, plaintiff could have made a viable claim under the
Baumol, Joskow-Klevorick, and Scherer rules, and arguably also
under the Posner rule.
2. CASE 2: Dominant Firm Pricing Under Sustained Competition
a. Facts. The dominant firm, a full line computer manufac-
turer, has a monopoly position in both the main frame and
peripheral equipment computter markets. Peripheral equipment
consists of various attachment devices, like add-on memory units,
which are plugged onto the main frame. No substantial barriers im-
pede entry into the peripheral equipment market, and several
firms have entered in the last few years. As a result, the dominant
firm's market share of peripherals declined precipitously. In a de-
liberate plan to recapture market share, the dominant firm selec-
tively reduced price in markets where competitive inroads had
been made, keying these price reductions to the loss of market
share. This reduced the dominant firm's profit margin in some
markets from fifty percent above average total cost to twenty per-
cent. To compute its costs, the dominant firm used a "revenue
apportionment formula" which assigned fifty percent of the costs
in direct proportion to sales !revenues received. The dominant
firm also used an accelerated depreciation accounting method, re-
sulting in the sale of substantial amounts of reconditioned equip-
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ment at extremely low prices (but still above book costs). The
price reduction did not force other peripheral manufacturers to
leave the market, but it severely reduced their profits. The domi-
nant firm also raised its prices on main frame units, where its
dominance continued unchallenged. It did not subsequently
raise its price on peripherals.
b. Judicial Ruling. Case 2 is a simplified factual version of
several recent decisions involving antitrust challenges to pricing
practices in the computer software industry.12 Finding no basis
for predatory pricing under any legal theory, the courts have uni-
formly ruled for the defendant dominant firm.' 2 '6 The courts
held that neither the strict marginal cost rule nor the average
variable cost rule supported the predatory pricing claims because
price in each case remained well above average total cost and
thus, by necessary inference, above marginal and average variable
cost as well. The high entry barriers exception did not aid the
plaintiff firms because their own entry into this market demon-
strated that entry barriers were not high. The marginal-cost-plus-
other-factors standard was not contravened because the dominant
firm's sales were always above full cost and profitable. 27  In the
absence of objective pricing misconduct, other factors, such as evi-
dence of the dominant firm's predatory intent, became irrelevant
to the predation issue. 28
Ruling on other specific issues presented in Case 2, the
courts have rejected plaintiffs' attacks on particular accounting
and pricing practices. Thus, one court held that the revenue
apportionment formula could not be impeached because the
dominant firm had adopted it prior to litigation and had followed
it consistently, even though it facilitated price cutting by effec-
" See California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1979);
Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 481 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. Cal. 1979); ILC
Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (The ILC
Peripherals case is commonly referred to by the name of another party in the litigation-
"Memorex.").
2I Indeed, the trial courts ruled with unusual decisiveness in two cases, granting the
defendant dominant firm's motion for a directed verdict in California Computer Prods.,
Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d at 731, and in ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp.,
458 F. Supp. at 426.
127 See California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d at 739-41; Transamer-
ica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 481 F. Supp. at 996-1002; ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp.
v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. at 432-33.
128 California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d at 764; Transamerica Com-
puter Co. v. IBM Corp., 481 F. Supp. at 1008-09; ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM
Corp., 458 F. Supp. at 436-44.
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tively reducing costs in direct proportion to revenue loss. 129 An-
other court noted that a price increase in the main frame market
where the peripheral manufacturers did not compete with the dom-
inant firm could not have injured the peripheral manufacturers
so long as price remained above predatory levels in the markets
where they did compete.' Creating a reverse implication to the
"meeting the competition" defense under the Robinson-Patman
Act, s ' another court held that a price reduction which did no
more than meet the lower price of a competitor was not predatory,
irrespective of costs. 32  I
c. Applying Economic Theories. A cursory application of the
economic rules to Case 2 suggests that the judicial decision is un-
assailable. It appears to be supported by almost all economic
theories of predation, including the Areeda-Turner rule, the Pos-
ner rule, the Joskow-Klevorick rule, the Baumol rule, and possibly
even the Williamson rule. Price remained above all relevant costs,
thus eliminating liability under the various cost-based rules. Plain-
tiffs fare no better under the non-cost-based rules. The smaller
firms were not forced out of the market, thus precluding liability
under the Baumol rule. Similarly, it is probable that one or more
of the Williamson rule requirements were not met because either
the smaller firms may not have been "new entrants" at the time
prices were reduced, or some or all of the sales may fall within
the exception Williamson allows for generational equipment.33
Viewed on their surface, the facts permit a plausible argument of
liability only under Scherer's open ended rule-of-reason
approach, with emphasis on intent. The case is not strong even
under the rule-of-reason, however, because the smaller firms were
not eliminated and market structure was not altered
substantially."'
A better understanding of economic analysis in predatory
pricing cases is provided by 'examining how a plaintiff competitor
firm could use appropriate economic rules to impeach this
'2 See Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 481 F. Supp. at 998-99.
130 See California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d at 745. The court spe-
cifically rejected plaintiff's claim that price increases in other markets were used to "offset"
the losses sustained in the market for peripherals. Id.
"' See note 153 infra.
112 See ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. at 433-34. See also
Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Basic Resources, Inc., 5 TRAD)E Rx'G. REP. (CCH)
63,947, at 75,889 (citing ILC Peripherals with approval).
" See Williamson, supra note 48, at 1315-21.
l5, The linear cost model might also support this conclusion because price remained
above cost regardless of the cost definition.
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seemingly secure conclusion regarding lack of predation.' The
following subsections analyze plaintiffs arguments and suggest
some responses for defendant dominant firms.
Possible Violation of the Areeda-Turner Marginal Cost Rule.
Although price was above average total cost and, therefore, above
average variable cost, this does not necessarily imply that price
was also above short run marginal cost. This is shown in Figure 7
(which is a partial reproduction of Figure 4). As illustrated in Fig-
ure 7, even a price above average total cost is not necessarily above
marginal cost. Indeed, when marginal cost rises substantially
above average total cost, pricing on an average total cost basis is
socially inefficient even in the short run., Allocative inefficiency
results because the price or incremental revenue does not cover
the incremental costs and there is over-consumption; thus, con-
sumers no longer pay for the full value of the resources they con-
sume. Areeda and Turner have recognized this possibility and
they now require that price exceed marginal cost under these
conditions.' s7 Figure 7 illustrates the relevant Areeda-Turner
pricing floor in solid lines.
It is unclear from the facts of Case 2 whether demand fol-
lowing the price reductions required a production level at which
the dominant firm's marginal cost exceeded its average cost. Dras-
tic price reductions (as large as sixty percent) substantially in-
creased sales of this equipment.'38 These sales might have caused
marginal cost to increase substantially above average total cost at
the increased output level that followed the price reductions.
Plaintiff's burden in establishing the dominant firm's mar-
ginal cost-difficult even for a firm to ascertain internally (much
less an adverse litigant) -severely limits the legal feasibility of this
approach. Moreover, defendant could reestablish its claim of
short run pricing efficiency by demonstrating that marginal cost
was not significantly above average total cost either because indus-
try demand was weak or because it possessed a large amount of
excess capacity.1 9
Possible Violations Based on Improper Calculation of Costs. Did the
dominant firm's pricing appear not to violate one or more of the
cost-based rules only because costs were improperly calculated?
"I This is not intended as a comment on the actual IBM pricing practices; Case 2 is a
severe simplification.
11 See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
117 Areeda & Turner, supra note 62, at 1338.
138 See California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d at 739-40.
"I See text accompanying notes 110-14 supra.
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FIGURE 7
Marginal Cost Pricing Above Average Total Costs
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Several long run cost-based standards adopt average total cost as a
pricing standard. The Areeda-Turner rule also uses average total
cost as its pricing floor when moderately strong demand exists.
On first impression, it might appear futile for plaintiff to chal-
lenge the cost calculation in Case 2 because the dominant firm's
price remained twenty percent above average total cost.
On the other hand, two !economic arguments undermine the
conclusion that the dominant firm's pricing resulted in an ample
price-cost margin. First, the average total cost concept utilized in
Case 2 does not contain a capital profit factor. Almost all judicial
decisions and economic writers considering predatory pricing
ignore the fact that the economic measure of average total cost,
which is incorporated in predatory pricing rules, cannot be de-
rived from a firm's accounting statement. Average total cost in
economic terms encompasses not only those costs shown on the
accounting statement, but also a sum as an imputed return to the
capital invested in the business.140 This economic measure is de-
rived from the principle that the economic cost of an activity in-
dudes the cost of alternatives forgone, and capital invested in a
business necessarily means the loss of opportunity to earn a re-
,40 Inclusion of a return on capital was recognized in Transamerica Computer Co. v.
IBM Corp., 481 F. Supp. at 1000-01, and in 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 18,
714a.
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turn elsewhere. Adding a "normal" return on invested capital to
average total cost in Case 2 considerably narrows the twenty per-
cent cost margin.' Plaintiff could then attempt to challenge each
questionable cost item because it would take only a slight upward
adjustment to push average total cost above the price level.
The second economic argument reexamines several of the
specific cost allocations made in Case 2. Assuming that average
total cost is the relevant standard, plaintiff may assert that (1) the
revenue allocation formula used by the dominant firm must be
closely scrutinized, because it facilitates predatory pricing by en-
hancing the ability to reduce price without undercutting average
total cost; (2) the highly accelerated depreciation taken by the
dominant firm could easily exceed actual wear and tear plus
equipment obsolescence, even taking into account the special fac-
tor of generational obsolescence in computer equipment, resulting
in actual below cost sales of reconditioned equipment; and (3) the
dominant firm's fixed costs ' should be computed on a replace-
ment cost, rather than historic cost basis, because only replace-
ment cost provides an economically correct measure of the value
of goods consumed in an inflationary era.
The judicial decisions under Case 2 facts indicate that plain-
tiffs relied on the first two assertions. The arguments were re-
jected by the courts, however, because the evidence demonstrated
that the revenue allocation formulae and depreciation methods
were long-established, non-invidiously applied accounting proce-
dures and thus provided an appropriate measure of "reasonably
anticipated" cost.'43 Probing deeper, plaintiff could emphasize
that strategic adaptation effects would follow if any plausible
accounting procedure were subject to unquestioned acceptance.
Although an accounting system must serve a variety of corporate
purposes, a legal rule that sanctions deep price cutting so long as
a consistent, previously established accounting system shows that
sales remained above cost, provides a powerful incentive for firms
to shape future pricing behavior by adopting such procedures
4 In Transamerica Computer Co., the court found that the seemingly ample 20% price
over cost margin was only slighly above the dominant firm's minimum internal benchmark
return after an allowance for capital return was made. 481 F. Supp. at 1000. Presumably, a
minimum internal benchmark return on capital sets the floor below which it is more profit-
able for the firm to invest capital externally than internally, thus providing a rough meas-
ure of the imputed cost of capital.
"I Fixed costs, for example, include costs for plant and machine tools. Average total cost
is the sum of average fixed costs and average variable costs.
143 See California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d at 704 n.19; Trans-
america Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 481 F. Supp. at 998-99.
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long before possible litigation." 4  It is even more difficult to
undermine this strategy in light of recent decisions that held in-
tent irrelevant in the absence of pricing below the relevant cost
standard. 4 5  Thus, the plaintiff could argue that only close scru-
tiny of established accounting procedures can prevent predatory
pricing activities by the far sighted firm.
An even stronger argument for plaintiff is that replacement
cost, rather than historic accounting cost, provides the proper
measure of economic cost in inflationary times.4 6  A replacement
cost standard will create administrative difficulties because the
relevant costs are not simply ascertained from a firm's accounting
statement. 147 When a legal rule rests essentially on economic
theory, however, there are limits to the amount of deviation from
correct theory that can be tolerated without undermining the fun-
damental rationale for the rule.4 8 Neglect of replacement cost in
a high fixed cost industry would clearly exceed such limits when
the legal standard is average total cost.
Attacking the Dominant Firm's Pricing as Unfair. On first consid-
eration, it is questionable whether fairness is a proper concern in
the economic analysis of predatory pricing. Indeed, Areeda and
Turner have dismissed fairness as an "unruly element." l9
Equity, however, is not an unknown concept in economic
14 Each predatory pricing rule gives rise to pre-entry price, output, and in-
vestment adjustments on the part of dominant firms whose markets are subject
to encroachment. To neglect the incentives of rules whereby dominant firms
make pre-entry adaptive responses of a strategic kind necessarily misses an important
part of the problem.
Williamson, supra note 48, at 293 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). See also Joskow
& Klevorick, supra note 50, at 252 n.79 I(courts utilizing average total cost test must guard
against creative accounting).
"' See Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 481 F. Supp. at 990. See also R.
POSNER, supra note 11, at 189-90; Williamson, supra note 48, at 287-88.
'46 See 1 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 115-16 (1970). See also SEC Regula-
tion S-X, rule 3-17, 17 C.F.R. § 210.3-17 (1980) (firms required to state earnings on re-
placement cost basis for SEC accounting reports).
" Historic cost is also unascertainable simply from the accounting statement of a diver-
sified, multi-market firm. See note 119 supra. Replacement cost, however, adds another
difficult dimension to this problem by requiring estimates of current and future costs. See
generally Areeda & Turner, supra note 62, at 1351-52. Perhaps the simplest approach is the
concept of "trended original cost" which is used in utility pricing. Trended original cost
ascertains replacement cost by adding an inflation factor to depreciated original cost. See R.
CAYWOOD, ELECTRIC UTILITY RATE ECONOMICS 176 (1972).
18 Thus, Posner has structured his proposed predatory pricing rule so that long run
marginal cost (replacement cost) is substituted for average accounting cost (historic cost)
whenever replacement cost exceeds historic cost. R. POSNER, supra note 11, at 190-9 1.
' See generally 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 18, 71 Ic.
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theory;5 ' economic writers, such as Baumol, Joskow and Klevor-
ick, and Williamson'5' justify their predatory rules on grounds of
fairness as well as efficiency. Moreover, one or more courts have
considered fairness to be a relevant factor when examining preda-
tory intent.5 2 Although there is no exact or accepted definition of
this concept in the predatory pricing context, the basic notion of
fairness can be roughly formulated as follows: fairness in pricing
requires the protection of new entrants and smaller firms in their
justifiable reliance on the dominant firm's preexisting pricing
policies. The key word in this formulation is, of course, ' justifi-
able." The dominant firm cannot be expected to hold a price
umbrella above new entrants and smaller firms. The economic
rationale for this rule is to provide a stable economic environment
that reduces the risk of market entry by protecting the entrant
against price retaliation that it could not reasonably have antici-
pated. Protecting the entrant against price retaliation not only
protects existing entry investment, but also stimulates new invest-
ment. In addition, the rule creates an incentive for permanent
low pricing by dominant firms that desire to deter or limit entry
as post-entry retaliation is constrained.
No single proposed rule explicitly embodies fairness as a
pricing concern. Williamson would prohibit the dominant firm
from increasing output for an eighteen month period following
entry. Baumol's proposed rule would prohibit the dominant firm
from reducing its price below a level that it is willing to sustain on
a long term basis. Professor Scherer would incorporate fairness
considerations in his rule-of-reason by allowing a court to place
considerable weight on the intent that motivated a price reduc-
tion. Still another approach is developed from the "meeting com-
"' See generally Elzinga, The Goals of Antitrust: Other Than Competition and Efficiency, What
Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1191, 1192-93 & nn.6-8 (1977).
"' See Baumol, supra note 74, at 26; Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 50, at 22; William-
son, supra note 48, at 337-40.
112 See Transamerica Computer Co. v. IBM Corp., 481 F. Supp. at 1010; cf. Barry
Wright Corp. v. ITT Grinnell Corp., No. 78-485-S, slip op. at 17 (D. Mass., Feb. 26, 1981)
(court cited examples of unfair conduct in upholding predatory pricing allegations). See
also Richter Concrete Corp. v. Hilltop Basic Resources, Inc., 5 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)
63,947, at 75,886-87 (S.D. Ohio April 7, 1981) (quoting with approval Transamerica Compu-
tet's critique of marginal cost pricing rule as " 'contradicted by the economic, political, and
social policies of the Sherman Act.' "); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F.
Supp. at 433-34 (fairness may explain court's holding that dominant firm's below cost price
is lawful when not below level necessary to "meet competition" of smaller firms); NATIONAL
COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES, REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT AND THE ATrORNEY GENERAL 150 (predatory intent by firm with market power
may violate Sherman Act even when price exceeds relevant cost).
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petition defense" under the Robinson-Patman Act, 53 and recog-
nized, to some extent, by one court in a decision under Case 2
type facts.14  Under this approach the dominant firm could meet,
but not undercut, the entrant's price. A meeting competition de-
fense represents the maximum expression of the fairness value
because it protects the entrant's reliance on clearly ascertainable
facts. Thus, the potential entrant is assured that after it decides to
enter the market, on the basis of the pre-entry price and its own
costs, the dominant firm will not undercut the prevailing pre-
entry price except to the extent necessary to meet the entrant's
own price competition. The meeting competition defense, like the
Williamson and Baumol rules, permits the dominant firm to
maintain low prices to deter entry, but limits the post-entry price
response.
Plaintiff could not easily make a fairness argument, however,
under the facts of Case 2. !The dominant firm in Case 2 did
nothing more than meet the lower prices of the entrants. Never-
theless, plaintiff could argue that there was a normal differential
between the dominant firm's price and the entrant's price based
on consumer brand loyalty"; thus, a price that met or closely
approached the plaintiffs price would, in effect, undercut that
price.' This argument appears implausible, however, in a mar-
ket characterized by sophisticated buyers.
d. Summary. On the surface, it appears that the dominant
firm's price was not predatory in Case 2 because its price re-
mained well above average total cost, the entrants' prices were not
undercut by the dominant firm, and the entrants did not leave
the market. Although the dominant firm's accounting practices
may raise suspicions, they were based on established procedures
that it consistently followed. Deeper analysis of the facts under
varying assumptions, however, revealed that the non-predation
133 Section 2(b) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 13(b) (1976), provides that a price reduction made in good faith to meet a competitor's
equally low price is an absolute defense to a price discrimination charge under that section.
See Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 240-51 (1951).
1"4 See ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. at 433-34 (price,
above meeting competition level held lawful irrespective of cost). See also Richter Concrete
Corp. v. Hilltop Basic Resources, Inc., 51TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 63,947, at 75,889 (S.D.
Ohio April 7, 1981) (citing ILC Peripherals with approval).
"' This has been recognized in cases under the Robinson-Patman Act. See Calloway
Mills Corp. v. FTC, 362 F.2d 435, 441 (5th Cir. 1966). See also Borden, Inc., 92 F.T.C. 669
[1976-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,490, at 21,505-08; id. at 828
[1976-1979 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 21,490, at 21,523 (Pitofsky,
Comm'r, concurring).
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conclusion hinged on an assumed relationship between marginal
and average total cost that does not exist at higher output levels.
The analysis also revealed several ways in which plaintiffs might
challenge seemingly secure cost findings under plausible economic
theories. Finally, the potential usefulness of a fairness standard
increased as the cost-based analysis became less secure. The facts
of Case 2, however, did not support a substantial fairness argu-
ment because the dominant firm did no more than meet the low
prices previously established by the plaintiffs.
C. Future Trends and Developments
The legal and economic theory of predatory pricing is still
evolving. The preceding discussion is proof-perhaps too vivid-
that judges and lawyers, as well as economists, confront a rich
array of alternative economic theories and legal rules. Certain
themes nonetheless emerge and provide a framework for asses-
sing future trends and developments in predatory pricing law.
1. Economic Theories
No single economic theory dominates predatory pricing an-
alysis; instead, several theories vie for attention, and more
theories are currently on the drawing board.'56 Although the eco-
nomic theories differ widely in their underlying assumptions and
behavioral outcomes, some generally accepted conclusions
emerge.
First, predatory pricing can be profitable under favorable
conditions. These conditions include: (1) differentially higher en-
try barriers for firms other than the entrant, which will reduce
probability of entry by outside firms after the entrant is forced to
leave the market; (2) initially high production costs for the en-
trant, even though the entrant's costs will eventually decrease if it
survives because of "learning curve" effects; (3) diversification by
the dominant firm into several geographic markets so that a pre-
datory pricing policy in one market will deter entrants in other
markets; (4) long lead time and risks in market entry such that
later entrants are deterred by the predation practiced against ear-
"' See Gilbert, Patents, Sleeping Patents, and Entry Deterrence; Hurwitz, Kovacic,
Sheehan & Lande, Current Legal Standards of Predation, § III, app. § C; Ordover & Willig,
The Economic Definition of Predation (unpublished papers, presented at FTC Staff Seminar
on Antitrust Analysis, 1980).
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lier entrants; and (5) production cost characteristics that allow the
entrant to produce at a cost level approximating the dominant
firm's costs only if the entrant builds a large scale plant.
Second, it follows from the preceding conclusions that a sim-
ple pricing rule cannot prevent all possible instances of predatory
pricing. Under any of the above enumerated conditions, the en-
trant could appear "less efficient" than an existing firm under a
cost-based rule, but predatory pricing could nevertheless cause
adverse economic consequences.
Third, a predatory pricing rule could impose serious costs if
it discouraged socially desirable price reductions, either by forbid-
ding harmless price reductions, or because of enforcement im-
perfections. Risk averse firms in particular might avoid legitimate
pricing strategies out of fear of prosecution or litigation. Courts
concerned with the possibility of overbreadth may more closely
scrutinize the structural characteristics of a market, including en-
try barriers, to insure that a rule does not discourage low prices
when unrestrained monopoly pricing is unlikely.'57
Fourth, in light of these factors, economic commentators are
beginning to recognize that the choice among alternative rules
should be based on a rough cost-benefit analysis because there is,
thus far at least, no ideal predatory pricing rule. 58 In practice,
such an analysis must resolve two important issues: (1) whether
predatory pricing behavior is likely to occur to some degree in the
absence of any predatory pricing prohibition; and (2) which rule
or rules are most cost effective in minimizing the sum of the two
costs of error-error from undeterred predation (under-
inclusion) and error from overzealous prosecution and deterrence
(over-inclusion). The courts that have been forced to choose an
appropriate rule in a particular predatory pricing case seemingly
viewed the issue as an all or nothing choice between rules of
general application. Professor Schmalensee argues, however, that
the choice of economic theories depends on the specific facts of
each case because the theories are only partial, rather than global,
descriptions of predatory pricing behavior.'59  Unfortunately,
there is no economic consensus as to whether a global or a local
approach should form the basis on which such choice is to be
made among competing theories.
... See Joskow & Klevorick, supra note 50, at 265-69.
158 Id. at 218.
"' See Schmalensee, supra note 75, at 1043.
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2. Judicial Applications
Each economic theory of predation confronts major technical
difficulties and complexities when applied to specific facts. The
courts did not at first realize the unsettled state of predatory pric-
ing as an economic theory, and perhaps did not fully anticipate
the difficulties of proving economic concepts such as cost or de-
mand. Nonetheless, several courts substantially adopted a mar-
ginal cost pricing rule after Areeda and Turner published their
pathbreaking article in 1975. As it became clear that economic
consensus did not support use of marginal cost as the exclusive
test for predation, and that legal application of the rule was
cumbersome, several courts retreated. Many judges probably now
realize that there is no simple economic rule for predatory pricing
that can eliminate perplexing conceptual and practical difficulties.
Consequently, the situation in the courts parallels that in economic
theory in that a single legal standard for determining preda-
tion has not yet emerged. Instead, the courts have used at least
four distinct legal standards: marginal cost, the high entry bar-
riers exception, marginal-cost-plus-other-factors, and average total
cost. Moreover, the legal and economic content of these standards
is not fixed. The courts have given litigants wide latitude to de-
velop the issues, particularly under the marginal-cost-plus and
average total cost standards.
The Supreme Court may possibly narrow the scope of preda-
tory pricing analysis by adopting a single pricing standard, but
such a development does not appear imminent. Regrettably, the
present state of economic theory has yet to produce a test that is
both comprehensive in its policy objectives (by promoting com-
petition and economic welfare over the short and long run), and
administratively feasible over the range of probable applications.
Thus, predatory pricing conduct remains subject to a rule-of-
reason type analysis amplified by the divergent economic theories
of predation. With several economic theories vying for accept-
ance, the inquiry is scarcely simple. Possibly the analysis could be
conducted as a two step inquiry. The first step would involve ex-
amining the alleged predatory pricing conduct under the various
existing economic tests for predation, as illustrated by the preced-
ing analysis of two model cases. The first step inquiry would be
dispositive when either the various economic tests point uniformly
or overwhelmingly in one directon, or when one economic test
emerges as factually most appropriate.6 When the first step in-
'60 Id. Factual dominance, however, will be difficult to sustain in contested litigation.
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quiry fails to produce a clear result, courts could then undertake
a second step analysis by evaluating the pricing conduct under a
more extensive balancing approach. This second step analysis re-
quires courts to balance the anticompetitive and output-restrictive
consequences of the alleged predatory conduct against the poten-
tial competitive and output-increasing effects generated by the
challenged activity. 6'
This approach may appear responsive to the present state of
economic knowledge and the current legal development in
predatory pricing. It must strike the objective observer, however,
as an elaborate-and expensive-procedure for regulating busi-
ness conduct that is thought to occur only infrequently. If the
motivation behind Areeda and Turner's original proposal was to
simplify the law, that result has surely escaped realization. These
concerns raise more fundamental questions about the wisdom of
the judicial development of predatory pricing policy since 1975.
III
CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS ON THE PREDATORY PRICING EXPERIENCE
AND THE JUDICIAL USE OF ECONOMIC THEORY
Prior to 1975, predatory pricing was a loosely structured,
somewhat opaque area of lawl in which the generality of the legal
standard left room for the ex ercise of judicial discretion. The le-
gal decisions, which failed to reflect a systematic use of economic
theory, were at least partially influenced by the perceived fairness
or unfairness of the dominant firm's pricing policies and similar
broad ranging considerations. In 1975, this amorphous legal doc-
trine was confronted by a well conceived economic theory joined
to a proposed rule of law. Anchored squarely on the economic
theory of the firm, expounded through standard economic dia-
grams, and exhibiting a sharp awareness of the constraints of the
legal process, the Areeda-Turner proposal presented a beguilingly
361 This approach is illustrated in E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., - F.T.C. --, 3 TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) 21,770, at 21,980-81 (Oct. 20, 1980). The issue in duPont was whether
investment and pricing conduct strategically related to achieving a dominant position in the
manufacture of titanium dioxide constituted predation. In holding that neither the invest-
ment nor the pricing behavior was predatory, the Commission used a multiple test
approach that involved inquiries under the Scherer, Williamson, and Joskow and Klevorick
rules. The conduct was lawful under each test, and that uniform result appeared to be
dispositive. The Commission dearly indicated, however, that if the analysis under the pred-
atory pricing rules lacked conclusiveness and fell into "gray areas," it would inquire into
the overall competitive effect of the predatory practices under a full "balancing approach."
Id. at 21,982.
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simple legal standard: short run marginal cost pricing. This stan-
dard simultaneously offered the axiomatic certainty of scientifically
deduced truth, and the administrative advantage of a drastically
simplified legal rule.
The adoption of a marginal cost pricing rule by several
courts profoundly affected subsequent predatory pricing deci-
sions. As the objective standard of marginal cost came to domin-
ate courtroom proceedings, the range of judicial discretion was
severely confined. When the plaintiff failed to meet the demand-
ing requirements of the marginal cost standard, the verdict
could be directed for the defendant. Moreover, consistent litiga-
tion losses by plaintiffs demonstrated that for all practical pur-
poses a predatory pricing plaintiff could not meet the standard
imposed by the marginal cost rule. A short, but essentially accu-
rate, description of the marginal cost pricing standard is that it
holds dominant firm pricing per se legal.
Reviewing the course of predatory pricing development with
the advantage of hindsight, many would conclude that the early
judicial response was premature. The extension of economic
theory on which the marginal cost pricing rule was based,
although well conceived, did not reflect an economic consensus.
In addition, the legal rule itself proved to be more complex than
suggested by its surface simplicity. Faced with these developments,
several courts retreated from their initially strong support of the
marginal cost rule, but not before the balance of litigation advan-
tage had shifted drastically in favor of the defendants. Such a
shift can be justified, and perhaps a rule of per se legality can be
defended, if predatory pricing is indeed a rare occurrence, as
suggested by some economic writers. More recent economic litera-
ture, however, fails to demonstrate a consensus justifying the dis-
missal of predatory pricing as economically irrational behavior.
Empirical evidence adduced from several trial records suggested,
but did not conclusively demonstrate, that predatory pricing
occurred infrequently. In any event, the courts did not purport to
adopt the marginal cost pricing rule as a device for eliminating
the predatory pricing offense and establishing the per se legality
of dominant firm pricing. On the contrary, they adopted the rule
without explicitly considering the drastic effect it would have on
legal decisions.1 62 Thus, the predatory pricing experience raises a
162 It might be implied that in adopting the Areeda-Turner rule, the courts accepted
Areeda and Turner's premise that predation is rare, see note 38 supra, but courts did
not make any such assumption explicit.
1981]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
more fundamental issue concerning the process by which courts
create legal policy from economic or other scientific theory.
The recent history of predatory pricing indeed can be seen
as a case study of the impact of economic theory on the courts. In
particular, it raises questions, bound to become more pressing in a
scientific age, of how courts should use new developments in eco-
nomic or scientific theory. Because this Article is based on a lim-
ited observation, drawn from a single field, the issues are raised
and left in the form of questions.
First, is it appropriate for courts to base their choice of a
legal rule on a well-conceived economic or other scientific theory
even though it does not reflect a consensus view within the eco-
nomic or scientific community? Second, if selection of a single
theory under these conditions is improper, how should courts
choose between competing theories, and how should courts ascer-
tain the existence of consensus when evaluation of proposed
theories may take years, and when even brilliantly conceived
theories may ultimately be rejected by the scientific community?
Third, do situations arise when even a theoretical consensus is an
insufficient basis for legal policy in the absence of empirical veri-
fication of the theory's predictions? This is especially important
for economic policy because many economic theories lack empiri-
cal validation. Fourth, in using economic theory and drawing pol-
icy implications from economic models, how can courts avoid the
omission of unarticulated vital elements embedded in previous
judicial experience? In the predatory pricing cases, for example,
should the courts have explicitly considered the effects of omit-
ting non-cost elements such as market structure or fairness con-
siderations? Fifth, when, as in the case of the marginal cost rule,
the insights from economic theory appear to require a reordering
of legal doctrine, should the courts also carefully assess the be-
havior likely to arise under the revised legal doctrine? Finally, do
not all of the preceding considerations suggest a renewed empha-
sis on the values and insights inlaid in long-standing judicial ex-
perience, built upon case-by-case adjudication, and on the advan-
tage of incremental policy change, achieved gradually and with
opportunity for self-correction? 163
63 The process by which scientific theory gradually evolves may provide a useful model
for courts. Professor Stigler observes: I
A new idea does not come forth in its mature scientific form. It contains logical
ambiguities or errors; the evidence on which it rests is incomplete or indecisive;
and its domain of applicability is exaggerated in certain directions and over-
looked in others. These deficiencies are gradually diminished by a peculiar sci-
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Appendix A
The Scherer Model
The Scherer model is a testing model for the Areeda-Turner
and other cost-based rules. It is not used to develop an alternative
rule, but rather it is designed to reveal the defects of cost-based
rules. Nevertheless, the Scherer model is an important contribu-
tion because it challenges the use of a marginal cost or other cost
standard as even a presumptive indication of the absence of pre-
dation. Courts often cite Scherer's critique of the Areeda-Turner
rule and thus, litigants should understand the basic arguments.
Scherer's model demonstrates in the marginal cost rule a
fundamental deficiency that arises when a dominant firm utilizes
a limit pricing strategy prior to entry. The marginal cost rule's
deficiency is that the strategy will succeed, unless the predatory
pricing rule is applied so that desirable as well as undesirable pric-
ing behavior is deterred.
In contemplating an entry decision, the future entrant's
primary concern is what profit it will earn if and when it enters the
market. Along with its own costs, the entrant's profit is affected
by the price that will prevail after entry. Scherer's model assumes
that to avoid diseconomies of small size, an entrant must enter on
a fairly large scale. If the entrant plans to enter the industry with
a large plant because of production economies, but the dominant
firm maintains its existing pre-entry output, price must fall. This
conclusion is obvious because unless the dominant firm reduces its
output, the entrant's output, when added to the dominant firm's,
can only clear the market at a significantly lower price. The pre-
entry price could be quite profitable for the monopolist but the
post-enty price anticipated by the entrant might be below the en-
trant's marginal and average costs-even if the entrant is equally
efficient. Thus, the dominant firm that strategically chooses the
appropriate pre-entry output level and price, and subsequently
entific aging process, which consists of having the theory "worked over" from
many directions by many men. This process of scientific fermentation can be
speeded up, and it has speeded up in the modern age of innumerable econo-
mists. But even today it takes a considerable amount of time, and when the rate
of output of original work gets too large, theories are not properly aged. They
are rejected without extracting their residue of truth, or they are accepted be-
fore their content is tidied up and their range of applicability ascertained with
tolerable correctness. A cumulative slovenliness results, and is not likely to be
eliminated until a more quiescent period allows a full resumption of the aging
process.
G. STIGLER, ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF ECONOMICS 14 (1965) (quoted in D. DEWEY, THE
THEORY OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 22-23 (1969)).
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demonstrates its intent to maintain that output level, can discour-
age entry by an equally efficient rival while enjoying substantial
short run monopoly profits.
The problem of large scale entry in relation to post-entry
price is illustrated in Scherer's key diagram, set forth in Figure
8.6 Industry demand, marginal revenue, and marginal and
average cost curves are app -opriately labeled. Unlike other dia-
grams used in the Article, Figure 8 contains a numerical scale;
thus, the short run profit maximizing price is $17, and corre-
sponding output is 100 units. The monopolist's average cost at
this profit-maximizing point reaches its lowest level of $10. For
clarity of presentation, several important relationships in Figure
8 are set forth in Table A under various entry conditions.
TABLE A
Output
ATC SMC
Market Dominant New Dominant Dominant Market
Total Firm Entrant Firm Firm Price
100 100 01 $10 $10 $17
130 130 0 10+ 14.90 14.90
180 100 80* 10 10 11.40
210 130 80* 10+ 14.90 9.30
*Average total cost for the new entrant at 80 units is $10.
It is assumed that the entrant is as efficient as the monopolist
and consequently there is some level of output for the entrant at
which its average total cost equals the monopolist's minimum
ATC at $10. More specifically, it is also assumed that the entrant's
average total cost reaches the minimum point at 80 units. If the
monopolist produces at its short run profit-maximizing output of
100 units and the entrant begins production with an efficient
plant producing 80 units, both firms would make a profit. Table
A lists $11.40 as the market price for the expanded output of 180
units, a market price which exceeds the firm's $10 average cost by
$1.40.
The dominant firm could attempt to force the entrant out of
the market by expanding output following entry to 130 units.
This increased output, assuming that the entrant's output is 80
1
164 See F. SCHERER, supra note 1, at 232-52.
796 [Vol. 66:738
PREDATORY PRICING
FIGURE 8
Scherer Model
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units, will force price to drop below $10-a price at which both
firms lose money. If the dominant firm has a deep pocket and if
it can effectively threaten that it will continue to absorb losses, the
entrant may be forced out of the market. Expanding output to
lower prices, however, constitutes a classical case of predation
dressed up with non-linear cost curves. It is illegal under the clas-
sical test and, of course, under the Areeda-Turner rule because
the dominant firm's average and marginal costs both exceed price
at a total industry output of 210 units.'5
Scherer, however, is concerned with a more subtle strategy.
Suppose the dominant firm, anticipating the possibility of entry,
sets its pre-entry output at 130 with a market price of $14.90. This
price-output combination violates neither the classical test nor the
' See Table A (bottom line), supra p. 796.
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Areeda-Turner rule because this price exceeds average total cost
and equals marginal cost. But if the entrant believes that the domi-
nant firm will maintain this level of output after entry, it will real-
ize that the market price must then fall below the $10 cost level,
and at that price the entrant will lose money.' 6' Hence, the domi-
nant firm has successfully deterred entry without engaging in pre-
dation because the entrant will not enter the market. 67  If this is
a realistic scenario, a serious policy problem exists that is ignored
by both the Areeda-Turner rule and the classical tests: an equally
efficient entrant is deterred from entering the market.
The standard response'to this analysis, and the answer that
Areeda and Turner offer, is that a cost-based predatory pricing
rule prevents the dominant firm from effectuating its output
maintenance threat. If the dominant firm responds to entry by
lowering price in order to maintain its artificially high output
level, price would then drop below its costs, both average and
marginal, thus violating the cost-based rules. Entry is not deterred
because the entrant will realize that the dominant firm cannot
lawfully maintain the artificial pre-entry output. Thus, the
Areeda-Turner rule actually forces the dominant firm to "move
over" for the entrant by reducing output so that its price does not
drop below average total cost.'
Several exchanges between Areeda and Turner and Scherer
have raised many detailed, sometimes technical, arguments. For
example, Areeda and Turner agree with Scherer that, assuming
the uncertainty of future demand and costs, it is unlikely that the
strategic calculus they hypothesized to counter the effects of limit
pricing will favor entry. They dispute, without citing any empiri-
cal evidence, whether exclusionary pre-entry output expansion is
likely to occur frequently.'69
'6 The entrant's output of 80 units plus the dominant firm's output of 130 produces a
price of $9.30. See Table A, supra p. 796,
167 The deterrence is not costless to the dominant firm because it must forgo the shortrun
profit maximizing price of $17 so long as there is a threat of entry. But it still does well at a
price of $14.90. Thus, the price is a "limit price," but, in contrast to the simple limit pricing
models that do not allow for scale economies, the limit price is well above the price that would
prevail under competition.
' See 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 18, 715b(a). At least one recent decision
attaches some significance to whether the smaller firm or the dominant firm started the
price cutting. See California Computer Prods., Inc. v. IBM Corp., 613 F.2d at 741-42 (find-
ing that dominant firm's price cutting merely responded to competitor's lower prices).
,69 The frequency or infrequency of the pre-entry output expansion strategy beyond
optimal output scale depends upon the credibility of the dominant firm's implied threat to
maintain this output after entry even though price would fall below cost. This issue can be
approached by asking whether such a threat is credible in the absence of any legal con-
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The most important objection, however, is that a cost-based
rule could require the dominant firm to reduce output after
entry. 7  A rule requiring output reduction following entry could
deter non-predatory dominant firm output expansion unless de-
liberately predatory expansions were effectively distinguished
from non-predatory expansions.' 7' Moreover, the application of
any rule involves some slippage, and the cost-based rule requiring
an output reduction is no different because it provides no incen-
tive to the dominant firm to charge less than the short-run
monopoly price, even in non-predatory instances, 7 2 if it must
abandon newly won customers after another firm enters the mar-
ket. For these reasons, Scherer concludes that a predatory pricing
standard based on cost alone is undesirable and that a more com-
plex rule is required.
The Scherer model thus illustrates the problems that may
arise under the Areeda-Turner and other cost-based rules when
the scale required for efficient entry is large enough to cause a
post-entry reduction in the market price. His limit pricing theory
hypothesizes that firms may set their pre-entry level of output so
high that price will fall below the entrant's and the monopolist's
costs if output is maintained after entry. If the threat by the
straints. A threat is not credible, for example, if the dominant firm's plant is optimally
designed to produce 100 units rather than 130 because the dominant firm will not incur
higher costs if it "backs off" to 100 units, a level which provides ample room for a new
entrant while allowing the dominant firm to earn above normal profits. On the other
hand, there are probably some one-time costs, such as getting used to a higher level of
production and establishing customer contacts involved in increasing output and sales so
that it is cheaper for the firm to keep output at 130 once it reaches that level rather than
expanding output at the time of entry (This logic would also apply to the entrant's similar
investments.). The authors of this Article conclude that there is a "weak" degree of credibil-
ity inherent in a limit pricing strategy that could be expanded by creating a disadvantage
for the monopolist which decreases output to 100 units after entry. The prospect of de-
liberately "building in" such disadvantages is the subject of some recent literature on pre-
dation and limit pricing. See text accompanying notes 170-72 infra. See generally Salop,
Strategic Enty Deterrence, 69 Am. EcoN. REv. 335 (1979).
' The possible output reduction is even greater under a suggested modification of the
rule by Areeda and Turner that would treat a price above average cost as only presump-
tively valid, subject to rebuttal by facts demonstrating that price was "substantially below"
marginal cost. See 3 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 18, 715b2. This modification,
when applicable, would raise the price floor for the dominant firm's post-entry price, thus
increasing potential output reduction.
171 Scherer draws the distinction between a permanent policy of pricing at low margins
(nonpredatory) and price reductions instituted in anticipation of entry by a specific firm
(predatory). See Scherer, supra note 45, at 880-82.
1'72 Firms often decide to reduce prices for various reasons, such as making the
product more competitive with substitute products. See M. PECK, COMPETITION IN THE
ALUMINUM INDUSTRY 58 n.47 (1961) (reducing alumimum price to increase substitution of
aluminum for other markets).
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dominant firm to maintain output is credible, even an equally
efficient entrant may be deterred from entry. However, if the
threat is actually carried out, the dominant firm's price will drop
below the Areeda-Turner cost floor. Because this would subject
the dominant firm to antitrust liability under the Areeda-Turner
rule, there is serious doubt that such a threat would be credible to
the entrant. Under these circumstances, Scherer's concerns do not
appear to create a serious lproblem with respect to the under-
deterrence of predatory pricing. The more serious risk, raised by
Scherer, is that a cost-based rule would lead to over-deterrence by
inhibiting a dominant firm's nonpredatory pricing and beneficial
output expansion.
Appendix B
The Williamson Model
The Williamson model is designed to demonstrate that a
dominant firm constrained only by the Areeda-Turner marginal
cost rule can act stategicallyl to select a plant size that precludes
entry by an equally efficient firm. ' Figure 9, infra, will help
illustrate the model.
The Williamson model contains several assumptions. First,
the dominant firm must produce at a fairly high output level to
reach minimum optimal scale (Qmi,). Second, the entrant has ac-
cess to the same technology (i.e., similar cost curves) as the domi-
nant firm; thus, the entrant's minimum optimal scale is also at
Qmin. Third, the entrant can enter at any scale that it finds profit-
able. Fourth, the Areeda-Turner criterion-price covers marginal
cost-must be satisfied at all times. Finally, the entrant expects
the dominant firm to expand output after entry to the fullest ex-
tent possible without violating the Areeda-Turner rule.
With these assumptions, Williamson illustrates in Figure 9
how the dominant firm strategically uses its choice of plant size to
prevent entry. The firm builds a plant that reaches maximum
efficiency at output Qm, as shown by the relevant short-run aver-
age (SRAC) and marginal cost (SRMC) curves which appear in
Figure 9. The plant is larger than necessary because an optimal
size plant in the absence of an entry threat corresponds with out-
put Q*.,74 The larger output Qm, however, creates a dilemma for
the entrant-enter the market with either too great an output
' ' See Williamson, supra note 48, at 299-306; text accompanying notes 57-62, 67-69 su-
Pra.
11See Figure 2 supra.
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or a smaller inefficient plant. The dilemma is illustrated with re-
spect to Figure 9 as follows:
1. Entrant enters the market with an efficient plant reaching
minimum cost at output Qmi. The dominant firm expands output
to Qm. The total output, Qmn plus Qm, forces the market price
below both the entrant's and the dominant firm's average cost. It
is assumed, notwithstanding the Areeda-Turner rule, that the
dominant firm is not required to reduce output below Q (the
optimal level for this plant size) to "make room for" the entrant.'75
FIGURE 9
Williamson Model
SRMC
LRAC
0 Qin Q*o Qm
OUTPUT
175 See notes 166-70 and accompanying text supra.
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2. Entrant chooses a less efficient output level below output
Qm,,. In this situation, however, the dominant firm can easily
force the market price below the entrant's average cost which is
now above the costs associated with Qm1i, by expanding output
beyond Q*. The dominant firm's output expansion does not
violate the Areeda-Turner rule because price is always above the
dominant firm's marginal cost.
This analysis demonstrates that there is no profitable output
level and corresponding plant size for the entrant and thus it will
decline to enter. At the same time, the dominant firm is allowed
to operate its plant at the short run profit-maximizing level (Q2)
in Figure 9. Because output Q2 exceeds the no-entry profit max-
imizing output Q*, consumers gain some advantages from the
limit-price strategy employed by the dominant firm, although they
could gain more if the monopolist had not behaved strategically
and entry had taken place. Thus, the Williamson model illustrates
how a dominant firm can strategically choose a plant size that
allows it to respond to new entry by expanding output and driv-
ing down the price while fully complying with the marginal cost
pricing rule.
Williamson acknowledges that neither the marginal cost pric-
ing rule nor any other predatory pricing rule will prevent domi-
nant firms from pursuing strategies to deter competitive entry.
He argues, however, that his rule limiting post-entry output ex-
pansion would provide greater consumer benefits than the
Areeda-Turner rule. The Areeda-Turner rule allows a firm to de-
ter entry by maintaining wasteful excess capacity without neces-
sarily increasing output, whereas the Williamson rule compels the
dominant firm to increase output prior to entry if the firm intends
to follow an entry deterrent strategy.
Two further observations regarding the Williamson model
and its critique of the Areeda-Turner rule are in order. First, it is
uncertain whether the behavior described by Williamson makes
sense for the monopolist from a long run profit-maximization
standpoint. The credibility of the Williamson rule's deterrent
effect requires that a firm build an extra-large plant before the
entrant is ready to produce. Because of the uncertainty surround-
ing the entrant's plans and the time needed to construct or ex-
pand an existing plant, the dominant firm may be forced to forgo
the no-entry profit maximizing output level permanently in anti-
cipation of possible future entry. This is a high price to pay for a
monopoly.
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Second, it is uncertain whether entrants are easily forced out
of markets by predatory conduct. This doubt applies not only to
the Williamson rules, but to the other rules as well. If the entrant
builds a plant, is it likely that it will give up this investment even
in the face of a dominant firm's predatory pricing strategy? The
entrant has invested in fixed plant and equipment just as the
monopolist has. In addition, if the dominant firm must forgo substan-
tial profits to eliminate an entrant, could it also adopt a live-and-
let-live policy that the entrant will anticipate? On the other hand,
it does not take a very strong assumption of aversion to risk by
the entrant to eliminate doubts concerning the entry deterring
efficacy of limit pricing.
